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I. TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A SERVICE SECTOR AND A
BACKBONE FOR OTHER SECTORS
The telecommunications market is one of the largest markets in the
world, second only to the financial services market. The International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimated in the mid-1990s that the telecommunications market was worth about $513 billion.' Although tele1. World Trade Organization, Press Brief: Basic Telecoms (Dec. 16, 1996) (quoting
estimates of the ITU) [hereinafter WTO Press Brief]. The ITU is a United Nations body that
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docommunications service providers acquire most of their revenue from
2
mestic demand, they are increasingly seeking international returns.
Telecommunications has a "dual role as a distinct sector of economic
activity and as the underlying transport means for other... activities."3 In
addition to financial institutions now transferring $2.3 trillion or more
electronically every day, educators, researchers, politicians, and others use
electronic means to exchange information.4 The demand for telecommunications services that transmit voice and data electronically is rapidly esca5
lating because of this interconnectedness.
There has been a significant shift from domestic intrasufficiency to
international interdependence in both the demand and supply sides of markets generally.6 As consumers become more sophisticated in evaluating the
world market, businesses have to maintain their comparative advantage in
services by globalizing research, manufacturing products with multina-

makes recommendations for regulators, provides technical assistance to developing countries, sets standards for shared telecommunications resources such as radio frequencies and
the geostationary stationary orbit for satellites, and helps mediate disputes among Members.
Wilson P. Dizard, International Regulation: Telecommunications and Information, in
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION: NEv RULES IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER 115, 122 (1988).
The purpose of the ITU is "to harmonize the actions of nations" for the "improvement and
rational use of telecommunications of all kinds." 21 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE IN INFORMATION, COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATION
SERVICES 14 (1990) (citation omitted) [hereinafter OECD, TRADE IN INFORMATION].
2. 35 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE BENEFITS OF COMPETITION 12 (1995) [hereinafter
OECD, TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE] (noting that the U.S. company AT&T has a

goal to receive at least 50% of its revenues from providing services outside of the United
States by the year 2000).
3. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Telecommunications, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1B, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 359 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 44, 73 (1994)
[hereinafter GATS, Annex on Telecommunications]. See also Jeffrey B. Ritter & Judith Y.
Gliniecki, InternationalElectronic Commerce and Administrative Law: The Need for Harmonized NationalReforms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263 (1993).
4. WTO Press Brief, supra note 1. See also Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg,
Navigating the GlobalInformation Superhighway:A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 275 (1995) (discussing multiple uses for the Internet). Senator John Ashcroft set
up the first on-line, citizen-to-government petition drive on the Internet.
5. In fact, this sector is one of the most positive contributions to the U.S. trade balance. See Fred H. Cate, The Future of CommunicationsPolicymaking, 3 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1, 3 (1994).
6. For example, AT&T, which must link up with other multinationals, expects to receive 50% of its revenue in foreign markets in less than five years. See OECD, TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 2.
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tional components, and targeting international markets. The telecommunications industry illustrates this phenomenon.
All of these factors-the high demand for telecommunications services, the interconnectedness of telecommunications sector inputs and uses,
and international dependence-created the need to avoid piecemeal and
segmented telecommunications trade policy.
Some countries have responded unilaterally to the changes in telecommunications by privatizing and deregulating their domestic markets.
Through privatization, the government transforms the telecommunications
sector from a state owned and operated enterprise into a private enterprise,
although the private enterprise can maintain a monopolistic position.
Through liberalization, the government allows many enterprises to compete effectively for consumer demand.
However, the most profound impact on the global telecommunications markets will likely come from the concluded multilateral negotiations on basic telecommunications services in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 8 under the auspices of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS). 9 The results of these negotiations could be the driving
force behind a wave of countries liberalizing their trade laws to ease the
harshness and complexity of providing telecommunications services over
national borders.

7. As the demand for telecommunications services internationalizes, "U]oint ventures,
partnerships, and other multinational teaming arrangements are increasingly becoming the
principal form of commercial and industrial organization." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: COMPETITIVENESS AT A

CROSSROADS 7 (1990).
8. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MLTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 2 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO Agreement establishes an umbrella organization
that will apply institutional rules to all of the multilateral trade agreements. What Is the
WTO?, GATT FOCUS, May 1994, at 11, 12. In joining the WTO Agreement, a Member
"agrees to the definitive application of the obligations of the Uruguay Round multilateral
trade agreements." Executive Summary Results of the GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,263, 67,295 (1993). However, accession to the
Plurilateral Trade Agreements remains optional.
9. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
1B, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE
LEGAL TExTS 325 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. The
commitments, made as a result of the basic telecommunications negotiations in 1997, were
officially incorporated into GATS 1994 by the Agreement's Fourth Protocol, which was
scheduled to put the commitments into force in January 1998. FouRTH PROTOCOL TO THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (WTO 1997), 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997)
[hereinafter FoURTH PROTOCOL TO GATS]. A protocol is a document to annex schedules of
further negotiations to the original 1994 Agreement. GATS, supra, art. XX.
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The February 15, 1997 negotiations on basic telecommunications
reached significant commitments. However, these commitments on basic
telecommunications cannot be considered outside of the bigger framework
of the GATS in the WTO. The conclusion of the GATS in 1994 set the
stage for continued negotiations on various service sectors and subsectors.
Thus, while the 1997 basic telecommunications commitments specifically
addressed the problems faced by those wanting to offer such services, they
were annexed to, and became an integral part of, GATS, which is the
foundation for all trade in services.
This Article begins in Part II by discussing the significance of the basic telecommunications commitments on liberalization, specifically
showing why sector negotiations on telecommunications and even subsector negotiations on basic telecommunications were necessary. Part ImI
outlines a history of the basic telecommunications negotiations in light of
the services negotiations under GATS that preceded them. In Part IV, the
Article explains how the obligations underlying all WTO trade agreements, namely most-favored-nation (MFN) status, national treatment,
market access, and transparency, apply to services, and more narrowly, to
the telecommunications services within the negotiations' scope. Part V
specifically focuses on the resulting commitments of the basic telecommunications negotiations that the WTO Members included in their service
schedules. In conclusion, Part VI addresses the potential benefits of full
implementation of the recent commitments to liberalize trade in basic telecommunications services.

II. NEED FOR GATS AND CONTI-UED NEGOTIATIONS ON
BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
While countries may have a variety of competing social and economic goals underlying their domestic policy for various services, 0 the
Parties to the multilateral negotiations on trade in services put the underlying objectives of all of the WTO agreements in the forefront of the discussions. These objectives include nondiscrimination among all Members,
market access, and transparency of laws and regulations. Keeping uniform
objectives in all of the WTO agreements will move the multilateral trading
system away from sectoralization toward a higher level of uniformity for
trade rules. However, there are multiple reasons that services, generally,

10. For example, some objectives commonly cited for telecommunications include
providing basic telephone services to rural or poor areas, servicing the broadest area possible, reducing prices for consumers, increasing consumer options, and effectuating technological upgrades.
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and telecommunications and its subsectors, specifically, needed ongoing
flexibility in negotiations.
A.

Services Versus Goods

Because services have received special treatment under domestic
laws and are inherently different from goods, the negotiations for services
in the WTO under GATS have taken a somewhat more varied approach
than that taken for goods under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)." However, the underlying objectives have been consistent.
Opening markets for a pair of shoes, for instance, mostly involves
those tariff and non-tariff barriers faced by the exporter at the border of the
destination country. Telecommunications equipment is treated in the same
way; telephones made in Taiwan can be exported to the United States basically like the shoes. However, trade in telecommunications services is the
transmission of an electrical signal that does not stop at national boundaries and that must be received, routed, and terminated within the foreign
country in order to be successful. Negotiating open markets for trade in
services is more complex for various reasons. Services are less fungible
than goods because they often necessitate person-to-person contact. Also,
the supply of services often requires an underlying infrastructure whereby
the supplier and recipient of the services can communicate. The supplier
must be given access to the foreign recipient by the foreign country's
regulators, who often impose technical and quality-based licensing barriers.
B.

Telecommunications as Distinctfrom Other Services

The telecommunications sector needed separate negotiations from
other service sectors because it has12 unique attributes as a backbone for
other services and as a service itself
Telecommunications infrastructures, as the backbone for other sectors, can have important economic, societal, and national security implications. Telecommunications infrastructures are as significant to the competitiveness of services today as the railroads were to manufacturing
during the industrial age. Telecommunications infrastructures are also key
to the maintenance of a technologically advanced military; thus, the national security implications of trade in telecommunications are higher than
11. Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. No.
814.
12. Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988 § 1372, 19 U.S.C. § 3101(a)(6) (1998)
(noting that telecommunications is an industry sector needing special negotiating attention).
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in many other services. Additionally, the importance of telecommunications infrastructures is compounded by technology upgrades that affect the
reliability and scope of their use.'3
As a service sector under GATS, telecommunications needed special
commitments in an annex to GATS. The provision of some services may
involve only two individuals with little involvement necessitated from others. For instance, an architect can sell to a foreign buyer the blueprints for
building a house.
Providing telecommunications services, however, usually requires
much more interaction with other private sector individuals and government officials. For instance, in the supply of telecommunications services,
the supplier might have to construct or obtain access to an international
communications network for its client.'4 In the event that the service provider has its own network, it must buy from product suppliers the necessary infrastructure components, such as integrated circuits, cable wires,
and radio and satellite-based equipment.' 5 The voice and nonvoice information is then sent over such a backbone network, which can be an interconnection of various modes, including mobile radio,'6 cellular, personal
13. For instance, just since the GATS negotiations, U.S. companies have started competitively offering direct broadcast satellite, referred to in the United States as "Direct TV."
Direct TV operates on the ku-band of the spectrum, and has the capacity to link directly satellites to end-users. This will be particularly beneficial for the entertainment and media industries.
14. OECD, TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 2, at 12.
15. The product providers may also sell to the consumers the end-use products, such as
telephones, fax machines, and computers. All of these infrastructure and end-use components have collectively been referred to as information technology (IT). PressBrief. Information Technology Agreement, WTO, Singapore Ministerial Conference (Dec. 1996). Although an integral part of the service sector, information technology falls under GATT.
However, governments that have had a restrictive trade policy for services have also impeded market access for IT in multiple ways. OECD, TELECOMMUNICATION INFRAsTRucTURE, supra note 2, at 47. Negotiating the Information Technology Agreement (ITA)
in the WTO was an attempt by signatories to break down one of these impediments-tariff
rates. MinisterialDeclarationon Trade in Information Technology Products (visited Nov.
1, 1998) <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/new/inftech.htm>. The ITA consists of the Declaration,
an Annex that directs parties to amend their Tariff Schedules attached to GAIT, and Attachments that describe the product scope. Any reductions benchmarked in the ITA are beyond the market access obligations of GATT 1994. The IT talks were conducted mostly in
1996, by the European Union, Canada, Japan, and the United States. Press Brief. Information Technology Agreement, WTO, Singapore Ministerial Conference (Dec. 1996). The signatories agreed to zero out their tariffs by the year 2000, on a most-favored-nation basis;
therefore, all WTO Members will receive the benefits of the ITA regardless of whether they
were signatories to it.
16. Mobile radio is two-way communication, but it does not occupy a single stream of
transmission. Therefore, the communication will not be to the exclusion of other incoming
communication or to the exclusion of other recipients picking up the transmission. An example of this communication is CB radio.
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communications systems (PCS), paging, 7 satellite, 8 wireline, 9 and fixed
wireless.20 To provide such a network of services, the supplier, unlike an
individual exporter of goods, has to adapt its corporate face to respond to
the inherent multinational demand. Supplier alliances that have become the
most competitive are those that cross borders, combine multiple types of
services, and interconnect the many modes of transmission.2 ' The potential
benefits of such diversified alliances are diminished substantially, though,
if these suppliers are unable to enter a foreign market and access the domestic infrastructures that are already in place and that reach the consumers.
The most significant roadblock to such access is that many of the
domestic telecommunications infrastructures are owned and operated by
governments. This is usually not the case with market access for goods, as
governments are not traditionally dominant suppliers of goods as they are
for certain services. Additionally, governments have a significant impact
on service markets through their role as regulator of telecommunications
services.

17. Cellular, PCS, and paging all use frequencies on the spectrum; however, they use
different bandwidth, are located at different places on the spectrum, and are regulated differently. Also, the transmission can be analog, digital (such as PCS), or both (like cellular).
Analog sends the message in a steady, unbroken stream. Digital breaks up the communication, which results in more efficient use of the spectrum.
18. Satellite services also use parts of the spectrum, but at a high frequency. In addition
to obtaining an allocation of frequency, satellite service providers must get an allocated orbital spot. Most of the satellite service providers transmit through regional networks that
were set up by Member states of a satellite treaty. The regional satellite organizations include INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT. The private networks and regional satellite organizations collectively carry over half of the international telecommunications traffic. Dizard, supra note 1, at 98.
19. Wireline service is the most traditional means of transmitting telephone calls. The
line links a stationary point (for example, a phone jacked in a house) to a local exchange
carrier. The lines generally run underground or above ground on poles. The wirelines can
be copper or fiber optic.
20. Fixed wireless services are intended to have the same effect as a wireline, that is,
the customer's call originates at a stationary point (for example, a phone jacked in a house)
and travels to a local exchange carrier. However, the transmission is over a wireless medium, such as cellular. The difference between fixed wireless and cellular is that with cellular, the customer is mobile, not fixed. Fixed wireless service is increasingly being used to
provide basic telephony to remote areas.
21. For instance, an alliance of EU and U.S. equity holders, "Global One," receives
inputs from and offers various services (telecommunications, broadcasting, and entertainment) through its multiple corporate arms. 'Time Warner Entertainment, USA" has U.S.
and Japanese partners, and has corporate stakes in telecommunications, entertainment,
computers, and trading. 44 BEN PETRAzzINI, GLOBAL TELECOM TALKS: A TRILLION DOLLAR
DEAL 28 (1996).
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The Uniqueness of Basic Telecommunications Services

The obligations of GATS and the Annex on Telecommunications apply only to those telecommunications sectors that the WTO Members incorporated in their Schedules. Mostly, the Schedules contained what is
commonly referred to as "enhanced telecommunications services." The
Members were not ready in 1994 to make commitments on "basic telecommunications services" because, unlike enhanced services, the supply
of basic services has been by state-owned operators or state-sanctioned

monopolies.
Enhanced services are those services in which the voice or nonvoice
information being transferred from one point to another undergoes an endto-end restructuring or format change before it reaches the customer.2 In
1994, the Members' Schedules generally included enhanced services, such
as electronic mail, voice mail, on-line information, electronic data interchange, value-added facsimile services, code and protocol conversion, and
data processing.'
Although the various countries define basic telecommunications
services differently,U2 overall, the Members included the same basic telecommunications service subsectors in their 1997 commitments.25 Basic
services "are voice and nonvoice services consisting of the transmission of
information between points specified by a user in which the information
delivered by the telecommunications agency to the recipient is identical in
form and content to the information received by the telecommunications

22. Enhanced services are defined as those that "add value" to the consumer's transmission of information by upgrading its form or content or by providing for its storage and
retrieval. The United States defines enhanced services as:
services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities (that is, public telecommunications transport services) which employ computer processing applications that:
i) act on the format, content code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's
transmitted information; or
ii) provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or
iii) involve subscriber interaction with stored information.
WTO SECRErARIAT, The United States of America, Schedule of Specific Commitments,
GATS/SC/90, 94-1088, ll.C (Apr. 15, 1994).
23. Id. All of these services can be transmitted over the various modes of telecommunications infrastructure. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
24. While the United States has an "evolving" definition of basic services, many less
developed countries consider basic services to only include voice telephony. As demonstrated in the negotiations on basic telecommunications, determining what category a service falls under can have a significant economic impact on the industry. See infra note 230
and accompanying text.
25. It is mostly the extent of their commitments that varied. See infraPart V.B.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51

agency from the user., 26 Basic telecommunication services include voice
telephone services, packet-switched data transmission services, circuitswitched data transmission services, telex services, telegraph services, facsimile services, privately leased circuit services, or mobile services. 27
The central governments of most countries regulate, own, and operate, either directly or indirectly, the telecommunications infrastructure,
often naming it the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration (P'T).2
Some countries have privatized infrastructures,29 but most countries maintain nationalized telecommunications infrastructures.30 Privatization alone,
though, does not necessarily benefit the consumers; privatization must be
accompanied by liberalization, which includes allowing meaningful competition with the dominant provider.3 By 1994, because many Members
26. JONATHAN DAVID ARONSON & PETER F. CowHEY, WHEN CouNTRIES TALK:
LNTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 86 (1988). Resale of these services was also included.
27. WTO
Secretariat,
Canada, Schedule
of
Specific
Commitments,
GATS/SC/16/Suppl.3
(Apr.
11,
1997)
(visited
Nov.
1,
1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html>. Many of the other Schedules, such as those
of Japan, the European Communities, and the United States, contained similar listings. As
for enhanced services, all of these basic services can be transmitted over the various modes
of telecommunications infrastructure. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
28. A PTT is a governmental entity that owns, operates, and regulates postal and telecommunications services.
29. "[O]ver 25 countries have completed telecommunication restructuring efforts. Another 35 countries have begun or are currently evaluating restructuring." 138 CONG. REC.
S5769 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Pressler). Many countries, though, want
to maintain some control to advance a particular policy or interest, such as raising revenue
from the sale of services, providing universal service, or protecting national security. Thus,
the following methods of privatization have been utilized: (1) selling ownership in some of
the telecommunications infrastructure but maintaining ownership for certain sectors; (2)
maintaining an equity interest in the private telecommunications company, possibly a controlling share-to either maintain control or acquire capital; or (3) including a provision in
the sale contract that ensures the right of the government to ensure universal service.
30. 141 CONG. REC. S7492-S7493 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
The teledensity rate, which is the number of phones per 100 people, generally grows twice
as fast in developing countries that privatize. PETRAZZINI, supra note 21, at 6. However,
there are exceptions to this. ITU, WORLD TELECOMMUNICATION DEvELOPMENT REPORT
1994, at 20 (1994) [hereinafter ITU, WORLD REPORT] (noting that the Turkish PTT has seen
a mainline increase of about 10% above world average for private providers and revenue
increases of about 78% above the average).
31. Usually, when a country takes initial steps for privatization, the sale is made to a
single domestic company or a cooperative conglomerate; thus, a natural monopoly is set up
in the domestic telecommunications market. While privatization increases efficiency of the
public telecommunications operator (PTO), competition reduces costs for the consumers.
PETRAZZINI, supra note 21, at 6. For instance, Japan does not have state-owned facilities, but
the country has been in a slow process of opening up competition since 1985. Japanese carriers, in comparison to U.S. carriers, are charged about four times the amount per minute,
had 3.3 times fewer the number of local calls, and 1.5 times fewer the number of longdistance calls. Peter Cowhey, Building the Global Information Highway: Toll Booths, Con-
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were already allowing competition for the enhanced telecommunications
services, they simply included those commitments in their Schedules.
However, the provision of basic services, which generates significant national revenue, was still largely the subject of state owned and operated
monopolies. 2
Privatization of government owned and operated telecommunications
infrastructures was not one of the issues for negotiation in 1994, nor in the
subsequent negotiations on basic telecommunications. However, it is imperative to understand that basic telecommunications services have been
traditionally supplied through the state in order to appreciate the pre-1994
commitments on basic services that states undertook as service suppliers
and as market regulators.3
1H1. NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF SERVICES AND BASIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
To understand the recently concluded negotiations on basic telecommunications and to comprehend how these negotiations fit into the services
framework, the history of the negotiations on services must be considered.

struction Contracts, and Rules of the Road, in THE NEw INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
STRATEGIES FOR U.S. POLICY 175, 180 (William J. Drake ed., 1995).
32. PTTs have often been described as the government "cash cows." Provision of basic
services in the domestic market alone is the largest revenue generator. OECD, TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 2. Additionally, for countries that terminate
more international calls (i.e., receive incoming calls) than they originate, they will receive,
through international settlements, foreign currency which they can use for any purpose. See
infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text (providing an explanation of the current international settlement system and its relationship to the WTO basic telecommunications negotiations).
33. Thus, there are four common patterns:
(1) Countries in which the government is the network owner and operator, the policy
maker, and the regulator. Developing and nonmarket economy countries often reflect
this model.
(2) Countries in which the ownership and operation of the networks are privatized but
where the government, through one entity, makes the policy for and regulates the
industry. This includes such countries as Germany, France, and Japan.
(3) Countries that have private PTOs, and where the government sets policy but that dele
gates regulation authority to an independent body that either reports to the government
(such as in the United Kingdom and Australia) or acts as an independent commission
(such as in the United States and Canada).
(4) Countries that have a private industry but little or no industry regulator. This is the
case in New Zealand, which sets only technical standards. ITU, WORLD REPORT, supra
note 30, at 68.
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Momentum for Service Negotiations

Between 1970 and 1980, international trade in services was growing
by about 19 percent annually (even though trade liberalization in service
markets was much further behind the liberalization of trade in goods), 3
and such trade accounted for an estimated 50 percent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) in emerging economies and 70 percent of GDP in developed countries.3 5 Realizing the vast market potential, U.S. service providers in the 1970s began to lobby for negotiations on information services
and related sectors.
During the 1980s, though, the momentum for negotiations really began to stimulate action in multilateral fora. The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Trade Committee, after being
urged by the United States, compiled a report which showed that trade in
services, even though substantial, could be further facilitated by multilateral negotiations on trade barriers.37 Also, a GATT report found that trade
in certain services was linked to trade in goods.38
Among the GATT Members, there was disagreement about whether
services should be an issue for negotiation. However, it was generally
agreed that within the context of GATT, the issue of service barriers and
the work of other international bodies on services should be further explored.3 9 Additionally, the United States suggested that4 each GATT Party
prepare a national study on its domestic service sectors. 0
34. Jimmie V. Reyna, Services, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY (1986-1992) 2342 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
35. PETRAZZINI, supranote 21, at 11.
36. Reyna, supra note 34, at 2343. Congress responded by: requiring trade in services
to be a specific objective of future negotiations, including the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds;
allowing the President to use the section 301 procedures on countries that maintained restrictive trade measures in services; and making trade barriers a part of the USTR's annual
report on foreign trade barriers. Id. at 2343-45 (citing the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §
2411 (1990); the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (1990); and Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1990)).
37. Id. at 2345.
38. Id. (citing the Report of the Consultative Group of Eighteen to the Council of Representatives, GATT Doc. No. L/5210, reprinted in GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 71, 74
(1980-81)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2346. This suggestion was reinforced by the GAT Ministerial Declaration of
1982. Id. The Declaration also stated that the Parties should share the results of their studies
and determine whether to take action on their findings. Id. (citing MinisterialDeclaration,
Adopted on November 29, 1982, GATT Doc. No. L/5424, reprinted in GATT B.I.S.D.
(29th Supp.) at 9, 21 (1982)). Some of the reports, once completed, showed "that in 1979
the growth rate of service industries outpaced the growth rate of all other sectors in both
developed and developing countries, and that in 1980, forty-eight percent of all workers in
the reporting countries were employed in service industries." Id. at 2347 (basing the infor-
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MinisterialDeclarationof 1986 on Services

In 1985 and 1986, as the Contracting Parties41 made plans for a new
round of negotiations, twenty-five OECD Members pushed to include
services in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), while twenty-three developing nations resisted.42 After some compromise on the part of each side, the
1986 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round was released. The
Declaration set the objectives for negotiations in two general areas: trade
in goods and trade in services.'
Negotiations in [services] shall aim to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services, including an elaboration of possible disciplines for individual sectors, with a view to expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive
liberalization and as a means of promoting economic growth of all
trading partners and the development of developing countries. Such
framework shall respect the policy objectives of national laws and
regulations applying to services and shall take into account the work of
relevant international organizations."

C. InitialService Negotiations
The Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS) was formed to oversee
the negotiations, which included setting the items to be negotiated in light
of the objectives and setting a time line for the negotiations.45 An initial is-

mation on the 14 reports that had been submitted by 1985) (citation omitted). The U.S. and
the U. K. reports called for negotiations for services similar to those for goods in order to
avoid segmentation of the service markets. Id. at 2347-48 (citation omitted).
41. Note that this Article will refer to the Members of the WTO in different ways.
"Members" is only used to refer to countries after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
The reference to "Contracting Parties," however, is used to reference the parties to GATT
before the formation of the WTO, and is used when the countries act individually, for example, implementing the commitments made during the Tokyo Round into domestic law.
The reference to "CONTRACTING PARTIES" is used when the parties to GATT, prior to
1994, act as a whole, for example passing an amendment to GATI.
42. Reyna, supra note 34, at 2354-55. The United States went so far as threatening to
begin its own separate bilateral negotiations in place of the multilateral round of negotia-

tions unless services were included. Id.

43. Id. at 2359. The topics to be negotiated included: "Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS); Functioning of the GATT System (FOGS); Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS); Tropical Products; MTN
Agreements and Arrangements; Agriculture; Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; Natural Resources; Tariffs; Non-Tariff Measures; Safeguards; Textiles and Clothing; GATT Articles; Dispute Settlement; [and] Negotiations on Trade In Services." Id. at 2358 n.113
(citation omitted).
44. Id. at 2359 (quoting MinisterialDeclarationon the Uruguay Round, GATT' Doc.

No. MIN.DEC, (Sept. 20, 1986), at 10).
45. Id. Both the GNS and the Group of Negotiations on Goods (GNG) reported to the
Ministerial-level Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC). Id.
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sue that had to be settled was how these negotiations would relate to other
international bodies. The GNS determined that most telecommunicationsrelated organizations and agreements do not attempt to liberalize fully
trade in the sense of the Contracting Parties' objectives, 6 and they often
contain exceptions for many of the service sectors considered by the Contracting Parties.47 Another issue was whether the results of the service negotiations would be under GATT or in a separate agreement. By 1989, it
was agreed that the GATS would be negotiated apart from, but in tandem
with, GATT, and that crossover between concessions and cross-retaliation
would not be permitted between the goods and service sectors.48
Although still controversial, some other issues were addressed in a
1988 report adopted by the Ministerial Trade Negotiations Committee: (1)
the definition of services would include cross-border movement of services, consumers, and essential factors of production; 49 (2) the coverage of
the framework agreement, GATS, should be as broad as possible in its
scope; ° (3) the framework agreement, similar to GATT, should contain
MFN and national treatment principles; 5' and (4) the specific needs of developing countries should be addressed, such as their access to 52distribution
channels, information, and markets for their exports of interest.

46. Id. at 2361. The OECD and the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) had sectoral arrangements for some services, but mostly they facilitated exchange of information and set technical standards, so in that regard they reduced non-tariff
barriers. Some bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCNs) agreements and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) cover services. However, FCNs generally address individual
rights under property, tax, customs, and shipping laws and regulations, and BITs protect
against unlawful entry and expropriation. Id. at 2399 (citing GATT, HorizontalAgreements
that Address Matters Pertainingto Services (Apr. 3, 1991)).
47. Id. at 2400.
48. Id. at 2362.
49. Id. at 2369 (citation omitted). Some countries wanted the definition to include
movement of capital and establishment of operations in the foreign market, while others
wanted to focus on the movement of labor. Id. at 2362-63.
50. Id. at 2369 (citation omitted). Developing countries wanted the agreement to apply
to all service sectors to ensure that the sectors they were primarily interested in did not get
excluded from the negotiations. The United States determined that financial and telecommunications services should be negotiated separately. Id. at 2362-65.
51. Id. at 2369 (citation omitted). The Contracting Parties did not, however, commit to
apply MFN and national treatment to trade in services without reservations. They knew that
trade in services is inherently different from trade in goods. Id. at 2365-66. See, e.g., supra
Part II.A.
52. Id. at 2369-70 (citation omitted). While the United States pointed out that any liberalization would benefit LDCs' trade in services, id. at 2366 (citation omitted), it was conceded that any agreement on services would, like the GATT, have to accommodate the
needs of LDCs through technology transfers, phase-in periods for obligations, and special
export opportunities. Id. at 2367 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XXXVI [hereinafter GATI]).
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The examination of specific sectors began in 1989. In the context of
the telecommunications discussions, a major issue that emerged was
whether the negotiations would include both basic and enhanced services.
In several countries, the latter were already open to competition, but basic
services were, for the most part, subject to at least one of the following:
heavy regulation, monopolization, or state ownership.53
D.

Two FrameworkDraftTexts and Sectoral Negotiations

In 1990, the Chairman released two draft texts for a framework services agreement-one in July and one in December. Additionally, there
were further sectoral negotiations.
The July Draft Text added to the 1988 TNC report but largely resembled the structure and substance of GATT, although the entire text was
"subject to further consideration." 54 First, on the issue of the agreement's
scope, the July Draft Text said that "all" sectors would be included and
subject to national treatment unless otherwise specifically excluded or excepted by a party in its Schedule.55 Second, the Parties exempted government procurement from the obligations even though there were different
positions about how long it should be exempted, and they agreed to try to
avoid the distorting effects of subsidies but disagreed on when they should
phase out subsidies. 6 Finally, there remained sharp disagreement over application of the MFN principle." The United States at first wanted to withdraw MFN status from the framework agreement because, as a country
that had a relatively open market in all sectors, the United States would be
put at a disadvantage by free riders that had some sectors closed.*' Ultimately, the United States agreed to have the MFN principle included under
the condition that the negotiations must also achieve sufficient market access and application of national treatment in all sectors.
The Parties were to outline in their respective Schedules their undertakings and limitations on market access and their reservations on national
treatment. Some Parties did not want the MFN principle to apply to basic

53. Id. at 2372.
54. Id. at 2382 (quoting Draft MultilateralFramework For Trade In Services, GATT
Doe. No. MTN.GNS/35 (July 23, 1990), at 1 [hereinafter Draft Framework]).
55. Id. (citing Draft Framework, supra note 54, at 5, 13). The text, however, did specifically exclude government procurement, subsidies, and incentives from requirements of
national treatment. Id. at 2386-87.
56. Id. at 2384-86.
57. Id. at 2383 (citing Draft Framework, supranote 54, at 6).
58. Id. at 2393.
59. Id. at 2387-88 (citing Draft Framework, supra note 54, at 15).
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telecommunications, while others wanted it to apply to avoid turning the
service negotiations into a lot of "sectoral reciprocity" arrangements.6°
The December Draft Text noted that there was still disagreement
over the application of MFN." However, the text did contain a sectoral annex on telecommunications and an annex on basic telecommunications, in
addition to other sectoral annexes. 12
E.

The Dunkel Draft of a Service FrameworkAgreement

In December 1991, the Dunkel Draft was released, which represented
another year of negotiations. 3 Most importantly, the Dunkel Draft put
forth an MFN article that represented a new consensus on the issue. MFN
was to be applied to all service sectors; reservations inconsistent with
MFN could only be taken on specific commitments and only under the
specified conditions listed in an annex for MFN exemptions.6
The Contracting Parties decided that the Dunkel Draft would not be
final as further negotiations were needed on several issues. 65 However, the
U.S.-EC clash over agriculture subsidies at the beginning of 1992 caused a
stalemate in the service negotiations. Additionally, several countries objected to the U.S. proposal to take an MFN exemption to basic telecommunications, the EU proposal to take an MFN exemption to audiovisual,
and the general quality of developing countries' offers on services. 67 Finally, by the end of November 1992, just before the annual meeting, the
60. Id. at 2392 (citing GATT Secretariat, Report by the Chairman of the Sectoral Ad
Hoc Working Group to the GNS, MTN.GNS/W/1 10, at 2 (Nov. 6, 1990)).
61. This issue stalled the negotiations through the spring of 1991, and at times, the issue of agriculture created a negotiation roadblock between the European Union and the
United States, id. at 2395, even though it had been agreed that the Parties would not resort
to cross-over between concessions in goods and services. Id. at 2362.
62. Id. at 2395.
63. Id. at 2411-12 (citing Draft FinalAct Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. No. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991)
[hereinafter Dunkel Draft]).
64. Id. at 2413 (citing Dunkel Draft, supra note 63, at 7). These conditions included the
following: "1. A description of the measure, 2. The treatment under the measure which is
inconsistent with Article II (MFN) of the Agreement, 3. The intended duration of the treatment, [and] 4. The conditions which create the need for an exemption." Id. (citing Dunkel
Draft, supra note 63, at 32). Additionally, exemptions would be reviewed every five years
to determine if they still would be needed. Id. (citing Dunkel Draft, supra note 63, at 33).
No new exemptions would be permitted unless they were adopted by a two-thirds vote of
the Contracting Parties under the waiver procedures. Id. (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 2418.
66. Id. at 2422.
67. Id. at 2419-22. The United States intended to take an MFN exemption for basic
services unless basic services were liberalized in other countries' offers, specifically those
of the European Community, Canada, and Japan. Id. at 2422.
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United States and the European Community reached an agreement on agriculture, and the United States suggested a two-year extension of the negotiations on basic telecommunications. 8
F.

The 1994 GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services

The U.S. recommendation was taken and the Parties concluded the
services agreement in 1994. GATS is divided into six parts, with a total of
twenty-nine articles and eight annexes.69 These articles and annexes lay out
a framework on which the Members have made their specific sectoral
commitments. 0 The annexes specify more narrow commitments for certain
sectors and commit the Parties to continued negotiations in other sectors.
G.

The ContinuedNegotiationson Basic Telecommunications
Services

The Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications of GATS
ensures the Parties that basic telecommunications were not a part of the
GATS commitments unless the Member specifically included commitments on basic telecommunications in its Schedule.7 Therefore, the Members were not required to take Article II MFN exemptions on basic telecommunications at the time of the GATS entry.72 However, the Annex
states that the exemptions would have to be taken at the conclusion of the
negotiations on basic telecommunications that are directed in the Annex.73
When the WTO Members turned their attention to basic telecommunications, an initial issue was the scope of the negotiations. The Members
decided at the outset that they would include all basic telecommunications

68. Id. at 2422. However, the European Community maintained that it would take an
exception for audio-visual services under the cultural exception. Id. at 2424.
69. GATS, supra note 9. Briefly, Part I, Article I, contains the scope and definition of
services. Part II, Articles II through XV, contains the general obligations and disciplines.
Part I1, Articles XVI through XVIII, contains the specific commitments. Part IV, Articles
XIX through XXI, contains provisions for progressive liberalization. Part V, Articles XXII
through XXVI, contains the institutional provisions. Part VI, Articles XXVII through
XXIV, contains the final provisions. The annexes cover the following: Article II (MFN)
exemptions, movement of natural persons, air transport services, financial services (on
which there are two annexes), maritime transport services, telecommunications, and future
negotiations of basic telecommunications.
70. See infraPart IV (discussing the substance of GATS).
71. GATS, Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1B, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TEXTs 364 (GAT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 44, 77 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS, Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications].
72. Id. para. 1.
73. Id. para. l(a)-(b).
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services. 74 The Members later determined that this would consist of all local, long-distance, and international services for public and private use; facilities-based and resale services; and services over all networks, such as
satellite, cable, wireless, mobile, and cellular."
At Marrakesh, the Ministers decided that the negotiations on basic
telecommunications would work toward "progressive liberalization of...
'basic telecommunications.' 76 Of note, is the absence in the Annex and the
Ministers' Decision of any language about progressive or eventual privatization. The United States emphasized that it is not trying to pressure other
sovereigns through the WTO negotiations to privatize their telecommunications industries.77 However, many Members expected a high level of cooperation on liberalization.
There were nineteen original negotiating Members, counting the
European Union as one.78 The Parties negotiated through the Negotiating
Group on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT)7 The negotiations began in
May 1994, and the first deadline was set for April 30, 1996.
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor had promised that the deal
would fail unless enough countries made sufficient offers to cover a
"critical mass" of the world telecommunications market. He did not define
exactly what constituted a "critical mass," but by the end of April, effec-

74. Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 439, 461 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 136, 144 (1994)
[hereinafter Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications].
75. WTO, Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications, S/GBT/4 (Feb. 15, 1997)
(visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (attaching notes of the
Chairman, para. (1)(a)-(c)).
76. Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 74, para. 1.
77. The conference report on the 1988 Telecommunications Act makes it clear that it is
not a U.S. objective for foreign governments to privatize their telecommunications sectors:
The bill contains no stated or implied requirement for the denationalization of
telecommunications monopolies or for the elimination of vertical integration
within foreign telecommunications industries. Rather, the bill assumes that specific negotiating objectives for each country will be established within the context
of the existing market structure of that country, with a view to achieve the bill's
general negotiating objectives.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-576, at 641 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1674
(emphasis added).
78. Included were: "Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, European Communities
and their Member States, Finland, Hong Kong, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, [and the] United States."
Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 74, para. 4.
79. GATS, Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 71.
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tive competitive opportunities did not exist in over 90 percent of the world
market. 0 The deadline was not met."'
The Council for Trade in Services did, however, make significant
progress in April 1996 by adopting a Reference Paper.82 The Reference Paper, if agreed to by a Member, was to be attached to that Member's Schedule of Commitments as an "additional commitment." Members could incorporate the Reference Paper as a whole and still take particular
exceptions to some of its provisions.83 For basic telecommunications services, the Reference Paper is a framework to address many of the regulatory
concerns service providers would have when entering a market that is not
privatized or fully liberalized.
The NGBT Members agreed to continue negotiations under the
Group on Basic Telecommunications (GBT) and to extend the deadline for
commitments on basic telecommunications until February 15, 1997. Also,
the Members of the WTO adopted the Fourth Protocol to the GATS, which
retained January 1, 1998, as the date of implementation for the Schedule of
Commitments.84
By the time of the Singapore Ministerial Conference in December
1996, there were still issues of controversy that the Reference Paper had
not addressed. These "outstanding issues" included the following:
ways to ensure accurate scheduling of commitments-particularly with
respect to the supply of services over satellites and to the management
of radio spectrum; potential anti-competitive distortion of trade in international services; the status of intergovernmental satellite organizations in relation to GATS provisions; and the extent to which basic

80. For the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), a "critical mass" was defined as
at least 90% of the relevant market. A "critical mass" would include all OECD countries
and some developing countries.
81. Several reasons have been cited for the failure of the negotiations. The USTR said
the negotiations failed because market access was not committed to by enough Members to
constitute a "critical mass" of the telecommunications market. PETRAZZn, supra note 21, at
13. Some have said it was because the satellite sector was not satisfied with the clarity of
the scope of the negotiations on satellites, while others claim it was the fault of the longdistance carriers that wanted better interconnection commitments. In the United States,
Congress seemed to be preoccupied with other governments' commitments on foreign ownership. Surely, it was a combination of all of these interrelated factors.
82. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Reference Paper, Apr. 24,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 367.
83. Fifty-four of the countries adopted the Reference Paper and its regulatory principles
in full. Three countries (including Brazil) committed to adopt it at a later date. Eight countries adopted some of the principles (including India, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Venezuela), and three countries (including Ecuador) did not make any regulatory commitments.
84. The Fourth Protocol also kept the telecommunications agreement open for signature until November 1997. FouRTH PROTOCOL TO GATS, supra note 9.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51

telecommunications commitments include transport of video and/or
broadcast signals within their scope.85

The issue of spectrum management was one of the last and most
controversial issues to be decided. Ultimately, a substance and technologyneutral approach was taken.8 6 It was decided that no commitments would
apply to satellite services unless satellite services were included in a
Member's Schedule of Commitments. Accounting rate reform was not an
issue on the negotiating table, but it received considerable discussion
among developed and developing countries throughout the negotiations.
Between April 1996 and February 1997, there were fifty-three participants and twenty-four observer nations. By the deadline, sixty-nine nations had made market liberalization offers, and all of these countries
combined accounted for approximately 90 percent of the world's telecommunications revenues.87 The second deadline, February 15, 1997, was
met.88 By November 1997, the Parties had to show they were legislatively

and technically capable of implementing their offers, and at that point,
they could improve their February 1997 offers. 8

IV. 1994 GATS OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS
In GATS, the Members sought to expand trade in services through
"progressive liberalization" and "higher levels of liberalization." Liberalization essentially encompasses the multiple concessions that would potentially allow higher levels of competition in the services markets and that
would keep those markets competitive.

85. WTO, Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications, S/GBT/4 (Feb. 15, 1997)
(visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html>.
86. See infra Part V.C.2.a (discussing the "scarce resource" exception to the basic telecommunications commitments as it relates to spectrum management).
87. FOuRTH PROTOCOL TO GATS, supra note 9. See also supra note 1.
88. See infra Part V (discussing the substance of the concluded negotiations).
89. Between February and November 1997, the United States worked with several developing countries to determine whether they were ready to submit offers and with several
other participants of the negotiations to obtain better offers. By the end of November,
countries were supposed to adopt the necessary laws or regulations to implement the February commitments. No U.S. laws needed to be changed, but the FCC did have to revise its
regulations to comply with the U.S. commitments on foreign ownership. See Rules and
Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomm. Market, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 23,891, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 750 (1997)
[hereinafter Foreign ParticipationReport and Order and Order on Reconsideration].For a
brief summary of how FCC regulations had to change, see Glenn S. Richards & David S.
Konczal, A New World Order Comes to Telecommunications, 15 CABLE TV & NEw MEDIA
L. & FIN., Dec. 1997, at 1.
90. GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 3.
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The GATS sets out the "scope" of how services can be supplied,
called the "modes of supply." Unlike GATT, GATS separates the means of
liberalization and the Member's commitments into two Parts-the
"General Obligations" and the "Specific Commitments." The "General
Obligations," such as MFN treatment, transparency, and non-tariff barriers, apply to all service sectors. The "Specific Commitments," such as national treatment and market access, apply only to those service sectors that
Members include in their Schedules. Various exceptions to the obligations
that apply to all service sectors, similar to some exceptions contained in
GATT, are outlined within GATS. These are different than the sectorspecific exemptions that Members list in their Schedules. GATS includes
institutional provisions, such as authorization for dispute settlement. Finally, GATS contains commitments to continue negotiations on various
issues important to all services. Also, in 1994, GATS attached an annex of
obligations specifically for the telecommunications sector.9 1
The Members' individual Schedules, which :contain their sectoral
commitments and exemptions, are an integral part of the agreement. At the
time GATS entered into force, the Members had fairly narrow commitments in their Schedules for telecommunications. However, following the
conclusion of the 1997 negotiations, the basic telecommunications services
commitments supplemented the original GATS Schedules. Thus, GATS
now covers the basic telecommunications sector of those WTO Members
that participated in the ongoing GBT negotiations. 92

A.

Scope

The GATS defines "trade in services" as the supply of a service
through four different modes. 93 Telecommunications services can be sup-94
plied or traded through all of the four modes: cross-border supply,

91. There is also an annex that commits the parties to negotiate further on basic telecommunications. See infra Part IV.G.
92. The discussion of GATS, therefore, will focus on its application to basic telecommunications generally.
93. The "supply of a service" is defined to include "the production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery of a service." GATS, supra note 9, art. XXVIII(b).
94. GATS, supra note 9, art. I, para. 2. "Cross-border supply," as defined in GATS, is
the most utilized mode of telecommunications trade. For instance, this would be the carrying of voice telephony over a network that transcends national borders. ITU, WORLD
REPORT, supra note 30, at 26. Some countries bound themselves to the other modes of supply, but not to this mode. For example, Hong Kong, in its 1994 Schedule of Commitments
on value-added services, did not bind itself to giving market access or national treatment for
cross-border supply even though it made commitments for all of the other modes. See WTO
Secretariat, Hong Kong, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/39, 94-1037, at 11

(Apr. 15, 1994).
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movement of customers, 95 commercial presence abroad, 96 and presence of
natural persons abroad. 97 The GATS Members must ensure that any measures taken by central, regional, and local authorities, and by nongovernmental bodies9" that affect a service supplier's ability to supply services
through one of these modes is in accordance with the obligations of
GATS. 99 Members are exempt, however, from applying GATS obligations
to those service suppliers that are supplying the service "in the exercise of
governmental authority. ' °

95. GATS, supra note 9, art. I, para. 2. "Movement of customers" is of growing importance to telecommunications services as advances in mobile communications technology
allow geographic flexibility and movement of the consumer equipment unit, such as use of
mobile telephones linked to roaming satellites or use of a calling card. ITU, WORLD
REPORT, supra note 30, at 26.
96. GATS, supra note 9, art. I, para. 2(c). "Commercial presence" is defined as
any type of business or professional establishment, including through (i) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person [such as a corporation,
trust, partnership, joint venture, or association], or (ii) the creation or maintenance
of a branch or a representative office within the territory of a Member for the purpose of supplying a service.
Id. art. XXVIII(d), (1). This is of growing importance as foreign countries liberalize their
rules of access, such as lifting foreign ownership restrictions and allowing competitive telecommunications interconnection. An example of the commercial presence abroad would be
a telecommunications company incorporated and established in the United States that has a
subsidiary in Hong Kong to offer domestic services in Hong Kong.
97. Id. art. I, para. 2(c). In the case where there is commercial presence abroad, this
would be of significance for managerial and technical operations. However, when labor is
the only interest abroad, presence of natural persons abroad may be significant in those instances where a developing country is receiving technology transfers or is implementing a
program of temporary privatization to effect upgrades in technology or infrastructure. For
instance, in Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangements, the foreign investor would need
to place its natural persons in the foreign country in order to operate temporarily the facility. ITU, WORLD REPORT, supra note 30, at 26.
98. GATS, supra note 9, art. I, para. 3(a). The nongovernmental bodies must be acting
with delegated power of the government. Id. para. 3(a)(ii).
99. "[M]easures by Members affecting trade in services" is defined by GATS to encompass measures with regard to:
(i) the purchase, payment or use of a service;
(ii) the access to and use of, in connection with the supply of a service, services
which are required by those Members to be offered to the public generally;
(iii) the presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Member for the
supply of a service in the territory of another Member.
Id. art. XXVIII(c).
100. Id. art. I, para. 3(b). The GATS states, though, that measures affecting trade in
services must conform to GATS obligations when the measures would cover a governmental supplier that is either supplying the services on a commercial basis or supplying the
services in competition with another supplier. Id. art. I, para. 3(c). Therefore, under the Parties' negotiations of basic telecommunications services, this provision would subject PTTs
to GATS principles unless the Parties specifically exempted their domestic PTT from the
obligations.
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B.

General Obligations
The overall objective of the GATS, to liberalize trade in services, is
similar to the objective of GATT, to liberalize trade in goods. However,
the general obligations that the Parties must undertake in GATS, such as
applying MFN treatment to foreign service suppliers, ensuring transparency, and reducing non-tariff barriers, are quite unique in many respects in
their application to services.
1.

Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
Article II of GATS requires that Members "accord immediately and
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service
suppliers of any other country."' ' Under the MFN obligation, all countries,
whether they have state-owned or privatized infrastructures, should allow
access to their market on a nondiscriminatory basis between service providers from different countries. For instance, MFN would require the
United States to be country-neutral to all Members of the WTO that
wanted to provide services in the U.S. market-regardless of the level of
openness of those countries' markets to U.S. service providers. Countries
would be in violation of the MFN principle for telecommunications if they,
for instance, acted discriminatorily when granting licenses to operate or
own networks, giving interconnection rights, setting access fees, and assigning radio frequencies to wireless services.
While the concessions made as a result of the basic telecommunications negotiations are similar to those made in a plurilateral agreement (in
that only those Members that were part of the negotiations are bound),
MFN is not granted on a "conditional" basis as with the plurilateral agreements. Thus, all Members that made basic telecommunications commitments are bound to grant the benefits of those commitments on an MFN
basis to all WTO Members regardless of those Members' participation in
the basic telecommunications negotiations.' °2 In effect, all Members to the

101. Idart. l1, para. 1.
102. The structure of GATS itself creates the classic "free-rider" problem. FouRTH
PROTOCOL TO GATS, supra note 9. As noted, however, a Party can take an MFN exception.
The exception is taken for a particular telecommunications sector and not with regard to
another Party; although, this is not looked upon favorably. For instance, the United States
was concerned about Canada's level of openness to U.S. investors in Canadian satellite
services. Thus, the United States took an MFN exception for direct satellite broadcasting,
generally, as opposed to taking an exception for Canada. Canada and the European Union
have already threatened to take the matter before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. See
infra Part IV.F (discussing dispute settlement for the GATS).
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WTO receive the benefits of the telecommunications negotiations,'03 but
not all Members are bound by the resulting negotiations.
There is a caveat, though. The MFN provision in GATS can be excepted.'" All countries guarantee MFN treatment in all service sectors,'05
but they are authorized to accord particular countries less than MFN treatment as long as they list these exemptions in their MFN Article II Schedule in accordance with the requirements of the Annex on Article II Exemptions.' °6 The GATS requires that the exempting Member notify the
Council on Trade in Services of all MFN exemptions it takes, state a date
of termination of the exemptions that should not exceed ten years,' °7 make
the exemptions, subject to a five-year review by the Council for Trade in
Services,08 and make the exemptions subject to future negotiations.' 9 This
divergence from GATT's MFN application, which does not allow such
exemptions reiterates that the "fungibility of goods" concept does not apply equally to services. It also recognizes that as the Contracting Parties

103. There is one exception to this. While a Member may always deny the entire package of benefits in GATS to a non-WTO Member, it can also deny GATS concessions to a
WTO Member against which it has invoked nonapplication of all of the WTO agreements.
WTO Agreement, supra note 8, art. XIII.
104. GATS, supra note 9, art. II, para. 1.
105. MFN reservations should be distinguished from market access and national treatment reservations. See infra Part IV.C (regarding the latter reservations). MFN treatment
must be accorded to all listed and unlisted sectors unless the MFN exemption is taken.
However, market access and national treatment must only be accorded to those listed sectors, and even then, particular reservations can be taken.
106. GATS, Annex on Article II Exemptions, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL
TExTs 352, para. 1 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 68 (1994) [hereinafter GATS, Annex on Article II Exemptions]. The individual Member's Schedule on Article II exemptions
became an integral part of the Annex on Article II Exemptions. Id. Any new MFN exemptions after the date of entry into force of GATS will have to be taken in accordance with the
waiver procedures of Article IX, para. 3 of the WTO Agreement, supra note 8; GATS, Annex on Article II Exemptions, supra, para. 2. In that case, a three-fourths vote by the WTO
Members in favor of the MFN exemption would have to be obtained by the exempting
Member. WTO Agreement, supra note 8, art. IX, para. 3(a); GATS, Annex on Article II
Exemptions, supra, para. 3.
107. See GATS, Annex on Article II Exemptions, supra note 106, paras. 5-6. The provision states that "[inprinciple,such exemptions should not exceed a period of 10 years." Id.
para. 5 (emphasis added). However, many countries listed their MFN exemptions as
"indefinite." The United States, for instance, listed indefinite on every MFN exemption it
took. GATS, The United States of America, Final List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions,
GATS/EL/90, 94-1153 (Apr. 15, 1994).
108. See GATS, Annex on Article II Exemptions, supra note 106, para. 3. The Council
will review the exemptions to determine "whether the conditions which created the need for
the exemption still prevail." Id. para. 4(a).
109. Id. para. 6.
110. GATT, supra note 52, art. I.
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continue their negotiations beyond the Uruguay Rounds, they are taking
more of a sector-by-sector approach.
MFN treatment can also be excepted in GATS by according some
Parties more favorable treatment through arrangements similar to the
Customs Territory and Free Trade Area that are authorized in GATT."'
These provisions in GATS and GATT apply to, for instance, the more favorable treatment that Canada, Mexico, and the United States accord each
other under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)."

2.

Transparency

As with GATT, transparency is a core principle of GATS. Article Ill
requires that each Member publish all international agreements to which it
is a party that affect trade in services as well as "all relevant [domestic]
measures of general application which pertain to or affect" the provision of
services." 3 The Members must also notify the Council for Trade in Services about any new measures that "significantly affect trade in services."".4

111. GATS, supra note 9, art. V. See also id. art. XXIV. The arrangement should be to
liberalize further trade in services between the Parties by eliminating substantially all policies that are not national treatment consistent (except in those cases where exceptions are
included in the GATS text, such as balance of payments, security, safeguard, and general
exceptions) for "substantial sectoral coverage." GATS, supra note 9, art. V, para. 1(a)-(b).
The GATS Article V provision, unlike the comparable GATT provision, defines
"substantial sectoral coverage." It states: "This condition is understood in terms of number
of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply. In order to meet this condition,
agreements should not provide for the a prioriexclusion of any mode of supply." Id. n.1.
GATS covers those sectors that the parties are able to negotiate sectorally through the annexes; thus it includes, inter alia, movement of natural persons, air transport, financial
services, maritime, and telecommunications. Additionally, these services are supplied
through the four modes outlined in Article I. Thus, two Members of GATS could not enter
into a bilateral arrangement that covered only basic telecommunications services supplied
cross-border. It would have to be multi-sector and through multiple modes of supply. Except that in Article V bis, arrangements on the labor sector are permitted.
112. Chapter 13 in NAFTA covers enhanced services, but it does not cover basic services. The enhanced services provisions require reasonable and nondiscriminatory access to
public telecommunications networks, transparency in information affecting access to public
networks and services, rates for public telecommunications transport services that reflect
economic costs, assurances that public network monopoly providers do not engage in anticompetitive conduct, elimination of investment restrictions for enhanced services, and
transparency and nondiscrimination in licensing or authorization requirements for the provision of enhanced services. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605, 653 (1993). In addition to the telecommunications chapter,
NAFTA contains chapter 12, which calls on NAFTA members to eliminate "prohibitive
incorporation or licensing requirements." Id. ch. 12, art. 1210.
113. GATS, supra note 9, art. III, para. 1.
114. Id. para. 3.
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Although, Members
are not obligated to publish any information that is
5
confidential.1
3.

Other Non-tariff Barriers

Non-tariff barriers to the services sectors are often prohibitive. Articles VI and VII lay the guidelines for Members to identify and negotiate
the reduction of specific service sector non-tariff barriers, such as criteria
for licensing, anticompetitive business practices, and activities of monopoly providers. The Members to the basic telecommunications negotiations
set out guidelines in these areas.
Article VI requires Members to ensure that "measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner"; " ' to ensure that licensing schemes or other
such qualification requirements are administered in a manner that is fair to
the applicants and are based on standards that do not nullify specific sectoral commitments;" 7 and to put in place, when practicable, a mechanism
for review of administrative decisions that affect a provider's ability to
supply services."'
Article VII addresses licensing criteria as technical barriers to
trade." 9 This GATS Article on "recognition" distinguishes between the
substance of the criteria and the procedure by which the criteria are implemented. Article VII does not attempt to dictate what the specific criteria
or standards for operation must be, so it is less strict than the technical barriers to trade limits under the GATT.' 20 The Article allows Members to impose autonomously their standards and criteria for denying certifications or
licenses.'2 ' Thus, the substance of the policies can be discriminatory if the
discriminatory policies are included in the Member's Schedule.'2 After ten
years, when these discriminatory practices are to be phased out, the discriminatory policies potentially could be refashioned into a statement of

115. Id. art. III bis.
116. Id. art. VI, para. 1.
117. Id. art. VI, paras. 3, 5(a). When determining whether a Member's licensing and
qualification requirements or technical standards are being used to nullify a commitment,
standards of international organizations will be considered, id. para. 5(b), as well as the disciplines on standards that are established by bodies of the Council on Trade in Services. Id.
para. 4.
118. Id. art. VI, para. 2.
119. This provision is somewhat comparable to GATT's provisions on technical barriers
to trade.
120. GATS, supra note 9, art. VII.
121. Id.
122. GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 3, para. 5(e)(iii).
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"technical integrity" for the Members' services.'3 Article VII encourages
Members to recognize as sufficient the criteria already met by a service
supplier under another Member's standards. 24 Preferably, Members should
agree, ina multilateral forum, to use internationally recognized criteria for
licensing.' However, where this option is not practical, Members may
enter into bilateral arrangements for mutual recognition criteria, 26 or a
Member may continue to set its standards unilaterally. 7 Procedurally,
however, the criteria for the licensing or certification of a service supplier
cannot be applied in such a way that would discriminate2 between countries
or that would constitute a disguised restriction on trade.' 8
Although most of the obligations of GATS concern measures taken
by Members that affect trade in services, Article IX addresses business
practices that restrict trade in services. Members are not obligated to end
such restrictive business practices, but they are required to consult with
another Member that complains about such practices and29 to "accord full
and sympathetic consideration' to that Member's request.
Granting a monopoly share of a service market to a domestic supplier
is generally inconsistent with the goal of market liberalization, but such
practice is common for the basic telecommunications service sector. Although the Members recognize that the elimination of monopoly suppliers
in these sectors is a decision that individual countries should have the sovereign right to make based on their national objectives and their domestic
anti-competition policy, the Members have committed not to let these monopolies become an additional barrier. Therefore, the Members allow monopolies to stay in place, but subject their operation to certain obligations.
Any monopoly supplier of a service 3 ' must, within its relevant market of
monopolization, comply with the Members' general obligations and spe123. Id. para 5(e)(ii).
124. GATS, supra note 9, art. VII.
125. Id. para. 5.
126. Id. para. 1. When the bilateral arrangement is used, the parties to the arrangement
must notify the Council for Trade in Services of the arrangement, id. para. 4(b), and they
should allow other interested Members to become party to the recognition arrangement. Id.

para. 2.
127. Id. para. 1.
128. Id. art. VI, para. 3.
129. Id. art. IX, para. 2.

130. A "monopoly supplier of a service! is "any person, public or private, which in the
relevant market of the territory of a Member is authorized or established formally or in effect by that Member as the sole supplier of that service." Id. art. XXVIII(h). Also, the obligations on any "monopoly supplier of a service" apply as well to those "exclusive service
suppliers, where a Member, formally or in effect, (a) authorizes or establishes a small number of service suppliers and (b) substantially prevents competition among those suppliers in
its territory." Id. art. VIII, para.5.
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cific sector commitments,"3 ' and, outside its monopolized market, it must
not abuse its monopoly
position or act inconsistent with any of the Mem32
commitments.
bers'
4.

Obligations to Developing Countries

When making specific commitments on market access and national
treatment for telecommunications, the Members are to give special consideration to developing countries, taking into account their need for technol-33
ogy and their ability to access information networks and export markets.'
Additionally, developed countries should provide, whenever possible,
technical and other information to service suppliers in developing countries."M
C.

Specific Commitments

GATS Specific Commitments-market access and national treatment-are incorporated in a different Part of the Agreement than the General Obligations because the Members are bound only by these two principles if they make an affirmative commitment in their Schedule to be
bound. Whereas, for the General Obligations, Members are bound by the
principles for all service sectors, unless otherwise excepted in their Schedules.
1.

Market Access

The market access commitment compliments MFN and national
treatment obligations. The principles of MFN and national treatment state
that ifa country allows others to enter its borders and to operate in its market, it should do so on a nondiscriminatory basis. The principle of market
access goes one step further and states that a country should allow the
highest possible access to its market, for instance, by not imposing certain
types of quotas or quantitative restrictions.
The market access principle applies to services differently than it
does to goods. Under GATT, market access encourages tariffication, which
is the transfer of non-tariff barriers into tariff barriers, and then it requires
the overall reduction or phasing out of tariffs. This principle applies easily
to goods, and specifically to telecommunications equipment, as unreasonable packaging requirements, content requirements, technical standards,
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. art. VIII, para. 1.
Id. para. 2.
Id. art. IV, para. 1(a)-(c).
Id. para. 2(a)-(c).
See infra Part IV.H.
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and so on, may be set up by a country as trade barriers. These barriers, assuming they are not legitimate quality concerns, can be quantified in tariff
schedules, and as the country's market becomes more competitive, the tariffs can be reduced. Market access, as applied to services, includes allowing a country to provide services through the four modes of supply in Article I, such as cross-border supply and commercial presence abroad. Thus,
market access is one of the most important and pervasive issues facing
service providers.
Article XVI does not require Members to open their service markets
to foreign service suppliers. It only states that when a Member undertakes
sector-specific market access commitments in its Schedule, they must be
within certain parameters. For instance, when a Member undertakes market access for a service, it will be assumed that there will not be any limits
on the ability of a foreign service supplier to enter the domestic service
market. With regard to a specific sector to which market access commitments were made, a Member would have to exclude
3 7 specifically any of
these market access elements that it wanted to except.
Before the conclusion of the 1997 Negotiations, Members' individual
market access concessions were fairly narrow for the telecommunications
sector. However, market access for basic telecommunications is now required for those Members that made February 15, 1997 offers. 0 9
2.

National Treatment

The principle of national treatment requires a country to grant foreign
service-providers treatment no less favorable than it grants its own domestic service suppliers.'4 For basic telecommunications, this means that foreign suppliers must have the opportunity to receive the same access to the
public networks as a41 national provider, regardless of whether that provider
is public or private.
136. Id. art. XVI, para. 2(a)-(f).
137. Id. para.2.
138. See infra Part IV.H (discussing the substance of the Members' 1994 Schedules of
Commitments).
139. See infra Part V.B (discussing the 1997 Market Access Commitments for basic
telecommunications).
140. GATS, supra note 9, art. XVII.
141. Id. para. 1. However, the Article notes that the national treatment commitments
should "not be construed to require any Member to compensate for any inherent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the relevant services or service
suppliers." Id. n.10. This is noted, surely, because of the difference between goods, which
are generally fungible, and services, which carry with them more personal and tailorable
characteristics that a domestic provider may be more cognizant of with regard to domestic
consumers.
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A problem arises, however, when the national treatment principle is
applied to privatized and state-owned systems. In the United States, where
the telecommunications service markets are private, national treatment applies as it does for products under GATT-neutral application of internal
regulations, taxes, and standards. Under the principle of national treatment,
the United States should apply regulations nondiscriminatorily inside the
United States to services provided by U.S. and foreign providers.
National treatment will mean something different for countries in
which the government is a market participant in addition to the market
regulator. Even as a market participant, the government, in theory, should
apply all internal laws, regulations, taxes, and standards neutrally among
all market participants. If the government taxed other providers, would it
have to tax itself? There are serious implications to the application of national treatment in a market that is dominated by a government-operated
service provider that is supplying services on a commercial
basis or sup142
plying the service in competition with another supplier.
These telecommunications-specific problems prompted many of the
GATS Members to take national treatment exceptions to their commitments. In GATS,
S
143 unlike GATT, the national treatment requirements are
not mandatory. A country has to undertake the national treatment commitments in its Schedule sector by sector in order to be bound by the principle, and a Member is not responsible for the inherent disadvantages that
a foreign supplier faces in the Member's market due to consumer preferences for domestic supply. 1" Even after undertaking the commitments of
national treatment, a Member can specify conditions or qualifications to
such commitments. 45
3.

Additional Commitments

Besides market access and national treatment, the Members of sectoral negotiations can, on a unilateral basis or in multilateral concessions,
include other commitments to liberalize trade in services in their Schedules. 146 In addition to the specific ongoing negotiations on the four service
sectors listed in the GATS Annexes, the Agreement calls for a comprehensive round of negotiations on services.

142. See supra note 100.
143. GATS, supra note 9, art. XVII.
144. Id. n.10.
145. Id. para. 1. See infra Part V.B (discussing the 1997 basic telecommunications
commitments and limitations on national treatment).
146. GATS, supra note 9, art. XVIII. See infra note 221 and accompanying text
(discussing the additional commitments in the Members' Schedules).
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GATS Exceptions to Obligations

1.

General Exceptions
There are exceptions in Article XIV of GATS, similar to those in Article XX of GATT, that allow countries to adopt measures inconsistent
with an obligation as long as the measures are not disguised restrictions on
trade and they are: "(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain
public order; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
[or] (c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement ..."'47
The Members included these exceptions in GATS because they recognized that Members may have national policies that necessitate restrictive trade measures for the purpose of protecting the public. Members have
often tried to use the comparable GATT exceptions to restrict trade that
they perceived would have negative health or environmental impacts,
while the challengers of those measures have frequently viewed the measures as economic protectionism intended to protect domestic suppliers
against foreign competition. The first sentence of the preamble of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization sets forth this classic environmental-economic conflict that underlies many of the disputes
under GATT, Article XX. There are probably few environmental reasons
for adopting restrictive trade measures for services; however, there are
numerous instances in which a Member may adopt such measures on the
basis that it is protecting social morality and order. Thus, societaleconomic conflicts may arise out of GATS, Article XIV.
How GATT,Article XX has been interpreted may give some indication of how GATS, Article XV will be interpreted, as their preambles and
specific exceptions are similar. In addition to the specific requirements of
each exception found in GATT, Article XX(a)-(g), the statutory language
in the preamble of Article XX sets forth several explicit requirements-the
restrictive measure being challenged cannot be arbitrary or unjustifiable,

147. GATS, supra note 9, art. XIV (emphasis added). The "public order" exception
could be implicated when a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the
fundamental interests of society." Id. n.5.
148. It states that Members' "relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view... [to expand] the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development.... WTO Agreement, supra note 8, preamble. The
1994 inclusion of the sustainable development objective is the first time that a multilateral
trade agreement has recognized sustainability as a guiding principle. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

Issues ES-3 (1994).

The GATT UruguayRound Agreements: Report on Environmental
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and the measure cannot be a disguised restriction on trade. 149 Of most significance, though, is each exception's requirement that the restrictive trade
measures be "necessary" for the enumerated purpose. For instance, GATT,
Article XX(b) allows a party to institute restrictive trade measures if the
measures are necessary to protect the life or health of plants or animals.
"Necessary" has been interpreted as requiring that there is not an alternative measure consistent with GATT that the asserting party could reasonably be expected to employ, and that the criteria that will implicate the restrictive measures be predictable by third parties. 50 As seen by the failure
rate of Parties invoking this exception, including the United States, the requirement that the measure be "necessary" is strictly interpreted against
the invoking Member.
Thus, if this definition of necessary is applied to the GATS Article
XIV exceptions, then the exceptions will rarely be used successfully if the
means of implementing, for instance, a domestic universal service policy,
are inconsistent with the general GATS obligation of MFN treatment and
non-tariff barriers. The exception's application to national treatment and
market access, however, would be limited to those sectors that a Member
included in its Schedule of Commitments.
2.

Security Exceptions

GATS, Article XIV bis allows a Member to withhold information or
take actions that are necessary to its essential security interests. This
provision is similar to the generally applicable national security exception
in GAT1 52 that "is so broad, self-judging, and ambiguous" that it can be
used essentially for whatever a country desires. 53
Some countries that have fought the trend to liberalize their telecommunications service sectors cite national security concerns. In the case
of basic telecommunications, the national security issue often appears to
be little more than a means to restrict the level of control that a foreign
service investor achieves, to further national social policy objectives, and

149. GATT, supra note 52, art. XX.
150. "United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930," L/6439, adopted on Nov. 7,
1989, § 5.26.
151. GATS, supra note 9, art. XIV bis.
152. GATT, supra note 52, art. XXI.
153. JOHN H.

JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:

LAW AND POLICY OF INTER-

NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 204 (1989) (referring to an instance in which a country
claimed that it had to maintain restrictive measures for shoe facilities because "an army
must have shoes!"). However, the GATT national security exception has been rarely used.
Id. at 204-05.
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to protect domestic suppliers, which often include the government-owned

supplier.
3.

Safeguards for the Balance of Payments

Members have an option in the International Telecommunication
Convention and in GATS, Article XXII to take a balance of payments exception, which allows Members to suspend their telecommunications
service obligations.' 54 However, this is not a likely tool for protectionism
because when this exception is taken, it has to be done under fairly strict
guidelines.'55

E. Issues for FurtherNegotiation
GATS encourages the WTO Members to continue negotiations on
specific commitments under the Agreement. 156 Article XIX of GATS calls
for a general round of negotiations on services, beginning January 1, 2000,
and sets out the parameters for these negotiations. Also, further negotiations are scheduled for specific topics, which are set out in the GATS Articles covering such topics. For instance, Article XV states that subsidies
will be an area for further negotiation. The same applies-to Article XIII on
government procurement and Article X on emergency safeguard measures. 157 In order to facilitate the commitments to liberalize their services
markets, Members
can negotiate further on a bilateral, plurilateral, or mul5
1
tilateral basis.

154. See International Telecommunication Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, art. 20, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 99-6, at 35 (1985). See also GATS, supra note 9, art. XXII.
155. Restrictive trade measures implemented inconsistent with the GATS obligations:
(a) shall not discriminate among Members;
(b) shall be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund;
(c) shall avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial
interests of any other Member;
(d) shall not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances [that necessitated the exception to be taken];
(e) shall be temporary and be phased out progressively as the situation [that necessitated the exception to be taken] improves.
GATS, supra note 9, art. XII, para. 2.
156. See id. arts. X, XIII, XV.
157. The Members do not include any substantive limits on themselves for taking emergency safeguards. They must simply notify the Council on Trade in Services if they take
any safeguard measure. Id. art. X, para. 2. They commit to negotiate the issue within three
years of GATS' entry into force. Id. para. 1.
158. Id. art. XIX, para. 4.
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Subsidies

The Members did agree in GATS to continue negotiations on the issue of subsidies."' By way of comparison, the Members have a subsidies
framework that has been the subject of numerous rounds of negotiations
for goods. The GATT subsidies provisions contain both the substantive
and dispute resolution provisions for subsidies and are now mandatory for
all WTO Members. 60 Essentially, when a Member believes that it is being
injured by another Member that is granting a subsidy for a product, it may
seek a remedy. Various GATT Articles can be utilized based on the type of
6
subsidies
d. 16216 that are being granted (prohibited subsidies,1 actionable subsidies, or non-actionable subsidies 6 ) and on the type of remedy that the
complaining party wishes to seek (unilateral retaliation' 64 or action
authorized through the WTO165). A mechanism for dispute settlement and
159. Id. art. XV, para. 1 n.7.
160. Id. arts. VI, XVI, XXIII.
161. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures contains the procedures
for obtaining authorization for countermeasures against a prohibited subsidy, an actionable
subsidy, and a nonactionable subsidy, in Parts II, Im, and IV, respectively. Part II Prohibited
Subsidies (also called "red light" subsidies) are those such as export subsidies, de facto export subsidies, and subsidies contingent upon the use of local content. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOmTIONS: THE LEGAL TExTs 264 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M.
44 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Subsidies Agreement].
162. Part III Actionable Subsidies (also called "yellow light" subsidies) are those that
cause injury to an industry of another party of GATT, nullify or impair the benefits of another party of GATT, or cause serious prejudice. Id. art. 5.
163. Part IV Non-actionable Subsidies (also called "green light" subsidies) include certain government assistance for industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, for regional development, and for the adaptation of existing equipment to new environmental requirements. Id. art. 8.
164. Unilateral action, such as countervailing duties (CVDs), originate in GATT Article
VI. Article VI allows a country to levy a CVD "for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or
subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any
merchandise." GATT, supra note 52, art. VI, para. 3. The Agreement entered into force
January 1, 1980. The 1994 Subsidies Agreement "contains a definition of subsidy (i.e., either a financial contribution or any form of income or price support where a benefit is conferred) and introduces the concept of 'specificity' (i.e., only subsidies specific to an enterprise or industry or groups thereof would be subject to discipline)." Terence P. Stewart,
UruguayRound Outlines (1994) (on file with author).
165. Multilaterally authorized action, such as countermeasures, originate in GATT Article XVI. Article XVI states that if a party maintains one of the various types of subsidies, it
shall give notice of the extent, nature, and effect of the subsidy. Thus, if another party to
GATT contends that the authorized subsidy is having harmful effects or hindering the objectives of GATT, it can proceed to Article XVI's dispute settlement in GATT. For example, if an export subsidy allows the exporting country to capture more than an equitable
share of the world market, then the subsidy would extend its authorization under Article
XVI. See GAIT, supra note 52, art. XVI, sec. B, para. 3.
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surveillance with regard to subsidies and countervailing measures is in

place. 166

As with the negotiations on goods, Members recognized that subsidies, in some instances, distort the effects on trade in services, and all
Members, therefore, should strive to avoid giving subsidies. 67 At the same
time, the only remedy is "sympathetic consideration.,1 6 ' Because the service sectors have traditionally been state owned, the subsidies provision in
GATS, not surprisingly, is weak.
When the state owns and operates the public telecommunications
network, it will often subsidize cross-sectors of the telecommunications
markets. For example, it may use its revenues from the basic service sectors to subsidize those markets that it has opened up to competition, such
as enhanced services.
It may be harder to negotiate specific reductions in telecommunications subsidies because unlike in goods, where the subsidy is often a direct
payment or financial incentive, the subsidies to service providers will
likely be favorable licensing and interconnection arrangements. These
types of subsidies are difficult to detect and hard to assess in value.
2.

Govermnent Procurement

The largest purchaser in a domestic market of basic telecommunications services is often the government for its official uses. The Plurilateral
Agreement on Government Procurement would apply only if the government is a Member to this Agreement. The Procurement Agreement formerly applied only to goods, but services were added to its scope. However, most countries, with the exception of the United States, have
included enhanced services in their Schedule of Commitments but have
excluded basic telecommunications services. This Agreement requires a
government, when purchasing goods and services for its own use as op17 0
posed to commercial use, to apply the principles of nondiscrinination

166. WTO, GATT ACrlvmEs 1993, at 77 (1994).
167. GATS, supra note 9, art. XV, para. 1.
168. Id. para.2.
169. Plurilateral Trade Agreements, Agreement on Government Procurement, art. III,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 4, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TE LEGAL TExTS 438 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33
I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 GPA]. This agreement entered into force January 1,
1996, id. art. XXIV, para. 1, and superseded the 1979 Agreement on Government Procurement, T.I.A.S. 10,403, 1235 U.N.T.S. (1979).
170. 1994 GPA, supra note 169, art. II1.
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and transparency 17' and not to develop specifications
that are performance
72
based, rather than design or description based.
Although this agreement is plurilateral at this time, the Singapore
Ministerial meeting may have set the stage for negotiations on a multilateral basis. 73 Additionally, with regard to services, the GATS notes that its
obligations do not apply to governments as consumers174 and states that
negotiations should begin on the issue of government procurement of
services on a multilateral basis beginning in 1997.175

F.

Consultation andDispute Settlement

Articles XXII and XXIII are the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of GATS and can be implicated in various scenarios. If a Member believes that another Member is violating one of its obligations in the
GATS framework, one of the Annexes, or in its Schedule of Commitments, then that Member can invoke the dispute settlement procedure under the WTO. 17 6 Article XXIII, however, only provides a basic outline of
authority and rights; it does not establish the procedural formalities for
dispute settlement. The current rights and obligations are set out in the
Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) of the WTO, which is referenced
177
XXIII.
Article
GATS,
by

171. Id. art. XVII.
172. Id. art. VI, para. 2.
173. The Members stated at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting that they agreed to:
[1] establish a working group to conduct a study on transparency in government
procurement practices, taking into account national policies, and, based on
this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement;
and
[2] direct the Council for Trade in Goods to undertake exploratory and analytical work, drawing on the work of other relevant international organizations,
on the simplifications of trade procedures in order to access the scope for
WTO rules in this area.
WTO Ministerial Conference, Singapore MinisterialDeclaration, 36 I.L.M. 218, No. 2122, at 226 (Dec. 13, 1996).
174. GATS, supra note 9, art. XIII, para. 1.
175. Id. para. 2.
176. "If any Member should consider that any other Member falls to carry out its obligations or specific commitments under [GATS], it may with a view to reaching a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the matter have recourse to the [Dispute Settlement Understanding]." Id. art. XXIII, para. 1.
177. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND OF
MULTILATRAL TRADE NEGOTIATONS: THE LEGAL TExTs 404 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33
I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding].
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Dispute settlement procedures have developed over a period of time
through practice and various rounds of negotiations. 78 To address directly
some of the problems of the pre-Uruguay Round dispute settlement procedures,' 9 the Members of the WTO made various changes that indicate their
willingness to take more of a legal rather than diplomatic approach to dispute settlement. Currently, Members have recourse to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) without the ability of one party to block panel formarequirement
that applied
tion,IS without
. . . . the
. consensus
~~182
•
•13
.. before 1994,81 with
strict time limitations, with a right of appeal, with the possibility of a
cross-retaliation remedy,8 4 and with the option of arbitration on the issue
of retaliation.'85
178. The Tokyo Round produced the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance. GATr B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980).
Later, in 1982, the GATT Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement was released.
GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 13 (1983).
179. Principle defects with the pre-Uruguay Round dispute settlement process have been
summarized as follows: (i) disuse; (ii) delays in the establishment of panels; (iii) delays in
appointing panel members; (iv) delays in the completion of panel reports; (v) uncertain
quality and neutrality of panelists and panel reports; (vi) blocked panel reports; and (vii)
non-implementation of panel reports. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GAT, 11
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 81-89 (1987). Another problem was the fact that under the Tokyo
Rounds each agreement had its own procedures, allowing the Parties to forum shop. See
John H. Jackson, GA7T Machineryand the Tokyo Round Agreements, TRADE POLICY INTE
1980s at 159, 180-81 (W.R. Cline ed., 1983). See also UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE EFFEcTIENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETILEMENT UNDER THE

GATT

AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS: REPORT TO THE COMMITrEE ON FINANCE (1985).

180. The DSB must establish a panel no later than the second time it considers a panel
request, unless there is a consensus against establishment. 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 177, art. 4.
181. A Member can no longer block adoption of a panel report, authorization of retaliation, or time limitations for each step. The panel report has to be adopted by the DSB between 20 to 60 days after circulation to Parties unless a Party appeals or there is a consensus
not to adopt the report. Id. art. 16. Parties can state in writing their objections to the report,
but this will not have the effect of unilaterally blocking the report. Id.
182. Overall, it is now possible to adopt a panel report within 14 months or less.
183. Either party is authorized to make an appeal to the Appellate Body. 1994 Dispute
Settlement Understanding, supra note 177, art. 17. The appeal is limited to issues of law
covered in the panel report, and the DSB must adopt the Appellate Report within 30 days
unless there is a consensus not to adopt the report. Id. The total time for the appeal is not to
exceed 90 days. Id.
184. This is a significant addition to the 1994 agreement. The Multilateral Trade Agreements have been "packaged," and a Member that accedes to the WTO must accede to each
agreement, including GATS. The preferred retaliatory action is within the same agreement
and the same sector, such as among types of telecommunications services. If this is not possible, then retaliation may be effected within the same agreement but in a different sector,
such as between telecommunications and financial services. Then, if those two alternatives
are not possible, retaliation can be authorized within a different agreement, such as between
telecommunications services and goods.
185. The findings of arbitration are to be adopted by the DSB and implemented unless
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In addition to these provisions in the DSU, GATS has a special provision for the Part III commitments, including national treatment, market
access, and any additional commitments listed in its Schedule. If commitments under Part m are being nullified or impaired, then the dispute settlement procedures of the DSB are invoked, but before retaliation can be
authorized, the Parties must try to determine a "mutually satisfactory adjustment." '86
G. Annex on Telecommunications
Telecommunications services were added in an Annex to GATS.'87
The Annex gives telecommunications service providers reasonable and
nondiscriminatory access to and use of telecommunications services within
the borders of WTO Members that have made telecommunications commitments."' This translates into the ability of foreign service providers to
enter a country and interconnect to its public network for the purpose of
offering telecommunications services to the public in that market.
1.

Obligations

The obligations in the Annex expand the obligations of GATS specifically for telecommunications. There are commitments regarding transparency, access to public networks, and treatment of developing countries.
However, by the terms of the Annex, these obligations apply only to services for which Members have scheduled a market access commitment.' 89
The transparency provision outlines what telecommunications information should be made publicly available: all tariff and non-tariff conditions of service, licensing requirements, conditions for interconnection,

the DSB rejects by consensus the arbitration findings. 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 177, art. 25. The arbitration procedure is available only for the issue of
when a Party must comply with panel and DSB recommendations. It is not for the issue of
whether the Party is ultimately liable to comply with the recommendations because
"liability"-or noncompliance under the terms of GAT-is locked in by adoption of an
unfavorable panel or appellate report.
186. GATS, supra note 9, art. XXIII, para. 3 (referencing Article XXI for procedures of
mutually satisfactory adjustments).
187. GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 3. See also GATS, Annex on
Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 71; see supra Part III.G (discussing
the Annex in context of the negotiating history of basic telecommunications).
188. Statement of Administrative Action, Apr. 15, 1994, WTrO Agreement, reprintedin,
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., H. Doc. 103-316, at
656 (1994).
189. GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 3, para. 2(c)(i). See infra Part
IV.H (discussing the commitments made in the individual Schedules).
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technical interconnection specifications, and standards affecting access and
use of public networks.'90
Access to public telecommunications transport networks includes the
right to attach interface equipment with the public network, interconnect to
the network, offer services to consumers, and establish an intracorporate
network.' Such access should be accorded on MFN and national treatment terms.' 92 Finally, Members with more developed telecommunications
systems are encouraged to give technical information and special consideration to developing countries.9

2.

Exceptions

In line with a government's right to regulate its domestic basic telecommunications market, it may need to put certain limitations on its obligations so that it is able to ensure the security and confidentiality of message content, to protect the technical integrity of the public network, to
provide or continue to provide universal services, and to maintain efficient
technical operations.1 94
3.

Relation to International Organizations

The Members recognize that there are several international organizations that set telecommunications standards.' 9 5 Most of the standard setting
is regulatory in nature as it addresses the need for interconnectability
among different types of information, such as voice, video, and data, over
different types of networks, such as land-line, satellite, and radio. 9 6 For instance, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) sets standards
for shared telecommunications resources such as radio frequencies and the
geostationary stationary orbit for satellites.
Additionally, the Members "recognize the role played by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and agreements in ensuring
the efficient operation of domestic and global telecommunications services, in particular the International Telecommunication Union."' 97 The
190. Id. para. 4.
191. Id. para. 5(b)(i)-(iii).
192. Id. para. 5(a) & n.15.
193. Id. para. 6.
194. Id. para. 5(d)-(f).
195. Id. para. 7(a). GATS also has a provision recognizing that, with regard to all service
sectors, Members should consult and cooperate with the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations that have jurisdiction over services. GATS, supra note 9, art.

XXV.
196. Dizard, supra note 1, at 128.
197. GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 3, para.7(b).
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shared jurisdiction of the WTO and the ITU over basic telecommunications became an issue when the United States tried to negotiate the accounting rate system in the WTO,19' which was put in place by the ITU
standards-setting body9

The United States argued in the WTO basic telecommunications negotiations that the procedures for setting accounting rates and paying settlements were undercutting its benefits achieved in GATS. Undoubtedly,
the accounting rate system, which was developed when the market for basic telecommunications services was generally government owned worldwide and monopolized, has a significant negative impact on U.S. service
providers, which operate under laws and regulations that allow for private
ownership and relatively open competition compared to other Members,*°°
and which, on balance, are injured by new technologies that allow others to
circumvent the settlement rate system.01
198. The settlement rate system sets out procedures for setting the rate for originating
the call (the collection charge) and the rate for terminating the call (the accounting rate) and
the procedures for the originating and terminating PTOs to balance their transactions (the
settlement payment). Essentially, the originating and terminating PTOs bilaterally negotiate
a price that reflects a share cost of 50:50, and then when they balance their accounts, the
PTO that originated the most calls pays to the terminating PTO the difference. ITU, WORLD
REPORT, supra note 30, at 27.
199. Id.
200. The rates were set without consideration to the actual cost of the transmission or
finishing of the call, neither were they, with a lack of competition in the market, forced toward marginal cost. The success of the system was prefaced on the following assumptions:
(1) "collection charges were approximately equal for the same call made in different directions and were applied in a relatively simple manner without off-peak rates"; (2) "incoming
and outgoing traffic was approximately in balance for each main bilateral relationship between countries"; (3) "collection charges were substantially higher than accounting rates";
and (4) "bilateral relationships were conducted by monopoly partners." Id. However, many
operators are lowering off-peak tariffs. There is a large deficit of termination of calls for
some developed countries that have competitive collection pricing such as the United
States. In some cases, the collection charge is less than the accounting rate. Furthermore, the
liberalization of both domestic and international markets has made the assumption about
monopoly negotiators obsolete. Id.
201. For instance, the following are some of the ways that the antiquated settlement rate
system can be circumvented:
(1) Private networks-Use of private networks by large corporations can undercut the settlement balance for the PTOs. For example, Toyota, which originates many calls,
could lease or buy a private line, and thereby, AT&T would not get the settlement
benefit of terminating all of those calls made to the United States.
(2) International Simple Resale (ISR)-Some calls that normally would have gone over
the public networks go over another's private line; thus, the long-distance carriers and
the foreign terminating carrier lose business. For example, General Motors (GM)
makes a large volume of calls to Japan, so it leases a circuit between a phone in the
United States and a phone in Japan. GM can sell space on its private, leased line by
allowing another to connect to GM in Japan and make local calls. In the United States,
the burden of proof is on GM to show that Japan gives reciprocal resale accessibility.
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Settlement rate reform has been discussed in the ITU, but there has
been sharp disagreement among many developing and developed countries.2 0 Several proposals have been put on the negotiating table,20 ' but
possibly the proposal most "consistent with the trade principles of market
access, most favored nation (MFN) status, non-discrimination and trans-

Only the United Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden have been certified as giving reciprocity.
(3) Call-back services-Since international calling prices are high in many countries, a
consumer, for instance, will call a U.S. call-back service operator that terminates his
call, calls him back, and calls the destination of the call. For example, if X in Paris
wants to call Detroit, Michigan, and his call-back service is in Baltimore, Maryland, he
will call his call-back service in Baltimore, the service will call him back and call Detroit. Thus, X will be charged by the Baltimore call-back service for two calls-the one
to Paris and the one to Detroit. Even though there are two calls, it may be less expensive than one call from Paris directly to Detroit. X could also use this service to call a
local number in Baltimore or an overseas number to, for example, Tokyo. The FCC
allows the Baltimore company to provide these call-back services, unless it is proven
that the foreign government expressly prohibits it. Thus, the burden of proof is not on
the U.S. call-back service provider as it is for a U.S. ISR provider.
(4) Internet services-Voice telephony offered by Internet service providers (ISPs) is not
part of the settlement system. Thus, this traffic travels over the traditional telecommunications networks as "free-rider" traffic. ISPs offer flat-rate voice telephony, which
puts them at a direct competitive advantage to traditional PTOs.
202. Developing countries have advanced a position that would keep the accounting rate
inflated above actual cost of termination and that would replace the 50:50 settlement balance with an unequal ratio in their favor. For instance, a ratio of 55:45 could be set so as to
reflect the higher costs for these countries to terminate a call due to their lag in technology
and infrastructure. ITU, WORD REPORT, supra note 30, at 27. Developed countries that have
moved toward liberalization would like to see actual cost of termination reflected in the rate
structure.
203. Briefly, these include:
(1) Sender Keeps All-Each carrier sets consumer collection rates and keeps 100%. This
allows new entrants, but it does not encourage operators to receive calls because no
compensation is given to allow incoming calls over their system.
(2) Facilities-based Payments-The originating PTO pays whoever owns the terminating
facilities a fee based on the cost to use whatever infrastructure is needed to terminate.
This would still require bilateral negotiation, which has a detrimental effect on those
countries whose markets are liberalized and does not address the circumvention problems.
(3) Volume-based Payments-The more volume that is sent, the less the terminating PTO
will charge the originating PTO. This would disadvantage significantly developing
countries, which may originate a high ratio but undoubtedly will not originate a high
volume. Additionally, ISR and call-back services would circumvent the volume determinations.
(4) Cost-based Payments-Rates would progressively be reduced to reflect actual cost of
termination. By itself, this solution would do little to address the problems of transparency and inefficiency.
(5) Uniform Call Termination Fee-All PTOs declare a settlement rate that is the same
regardless of where the call originates. Id. at 28.
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parency" is the proposal to give each country the option to set a random
high fee or to base its fee on cost.2 4
Understanding that the position of many developed countries is to see
reform in the settlement system, several developing countries took formal
exceptions to the MFN principle in their February 15, 1997 GATS basic
telecommunications offer, maintaining their bilaterally negotiated rates.205
According to some negotiators, however, the exceptions were unnecessary
because settlement rate regulation
and dispute settlement remain under the
°
full jurisdiction of the ITU.2
H.

Schedule of Specific Commitments

Any sector-specific commitments on market access or national treatment must be in a Member's Schedule, which is an integral part of
GATS.2' By listing a service sector in its Schedule, a Member makes a
binding commitment to allow foreign suppliers into its market and to treat
them the same as its domestic suppliers. Thus, if any sector-specific reservations will be taken, the Member must include those in its Schedule as
well. All undertakings are assumed to be immediately implemented after
the Schedules take effect January 1, 1998. Thus, any limits on immediate
implementation of undertakings upon this date must be included in the
Schedule as a limitation.20'
Each Member's Schedule of Commitments consists of four columns,
one for each of the following: a list of sectors and subsectors, limitations
on market access for the listed sectors, limitations on national treatment
for each sector, and additional commitments on each sector.
There are twelve general categories of service sectors of which communications is one.209 These are broad categories whose scope can be expanded or minimized by Members. Additionally, Members may leave any
of the categories out of their Schedules. For instance, the United States
listed in its "communications services" sector several subsectors, including

204. Id.
205. WTO Deal Includes U.S. MFN Exemption on Some Satellite Services, INsIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 18, 1997 [hereinafter WTO Deal].
206. Id.
207. GATS, supra note 9, art. XX.
208. Id. para. 1.
209. In order to ensure that inconsistencies between Members' Schedules do not become
an additional barrier to trade, the WTO identified twelve sectors that Members should use
as a framework for listing their sectoral commitments. At the time GATS was adopted,
these included: (1) business, (2) communication, (3) construction and engineering, (4) distribution, (5) education, (6) environment, (7) financial, (8) health, (9) travel and tourism,
(10) recreation, culture, and sports, (11) transportation, and (12) other.
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land-based courier services, telecommunications, and audiovisual services. 210 Specifically for telecommunications, the United States only includes "enhanced telecommunications services" as defined by FCC regulations.1
The limitations on the market access column must contain any limitations on the number of service suppliers, the value of service transactions
or assets, the number of service operations, the quality of service output in
terms of quotas (based on an economic needs test), the number of natural
persons needed for operations, the types of legal entities or joint ventures,
and the percentage of foreign capital shareholding or investment.212 Such
limitations must be listed for each of the four modes of supply: crossborder.I supply, consumption
abroad, commercial presence, and presence of
211
natural persons. The United States, for instance, has no limitations listed
214
for the first three modes of supply of enhanced services. For the presence
of natural persons mode of supply, the United States lists its commitment
as "unbound, except as indicated in the horizontal section." By listing itself as unbound, the United States does not make any sector-specific
commitments for enhanced telecommunications services. 2' 5 However, the
horizontal commitments, which are listed at the beginning of a Member's
Schedule, apply to all of the sectors in the Schedule. Many countries listed
216
movement of persons in their horizontal commitments. Ultimately, when
reviewing the sectoral commitments of the United States on enhanced
services, the horizontal commitments must be referenced for the fourth
217
mode of supply, movement of natural persons.
210. WTO Secretariat, The United States of America, Schedule of Specific Commitments,
GATS/SC/90, 94-1088, at 44-49 (Apr. 15, 1994).
211. Id. The Schedule gives a U.S. regulation citation, and it incorporates the definition
into the text of the Schedule. Most other countries incorporate a definition as well; although, they do not always reference their domestic legislation. See, e.g., GATS Secretariat,
Hong Kong, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATSISCI39, 94-1037, at 11 (Apr. 15,
1994).
212. GATS, supra note 9, art. XVI, para. 2(a)-(f).
213. See supra notes 94-97.
214. The most liberal offer will read "none" in the column of limitations on market access. GATS Secretariat, Hong Kong, Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/39, 941037, at 11 (Apr. 15, 1994) (listing "none" in the "consumption abroad" mode of supply).
215. Note that sometimes, "unbound" is used when it is not technically feasible to make
a commitment on a mode of supply for a particular service. See, e.g., GATS, The United
States of America, Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 210, at 76.
216. In its horizontal commitments, the United States, for instance, made a commitment
to allow for temporary entry and stay of natural persons within specified categories. Id. at 17.
217. Many countries also made horizontal commitments on foreign investment, so, when
reviewing the sectoral commitments, the horizontal commitment on foreign investment
would likely have to be referenced for the third mode of supply, commercial presence.
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The limitations on national treatment column follows the same general format as the market access column. For each mode of supply of enhanced telecommunications services, the United States listed that its limitations are "none. ' 21 8 Hong Kong, however, lists "none" only for
commercial
presence and is "unbound" on the other three modes of sup219
ply.

The last column is for commitments in addition to the General Obligations contained in the GATS framework agreement and the Specific
Commitments listed in the Schedule. Listing any additional commitments
in this column is optional, but the types of commitments made generally
concern licensing and standards.2 °

Once a commitment is made in a Member's Schedule, it cannot be
withdrawn unless the commitment was one that did not benefit any other
Member or the withdrawing Member gives a compensatory adjustment in
the case that there was a benefit withdrawn under Article XXI, Modification of Schedules.2 I If compensation is not given under this provision, the
injured Member can request consultation with the withdrawing Member or
utilize the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO DSB, which can re222
sult in required compensation.

V. 1997 GATS COMMITMENTS
The continued negotiation on basic telecommunications was an effort
by some Members to include these services in their Schedule of Commitments. The February 15, 1997 conclusion showed that the effort was successful. Thus, for each Member that participated in the continued negotiations, the following apply to its basic telecommunications services sectors:
the obligations of GATS 1994, 223 the 1994 Annex on Telecommunications, 224 any 1997 limitations to MFN for basic telecommunications that it
annexed to its 1994 List of Article II Exemptions,22 5 any 1997 commitments or limitations on market access and national treatment for basic

218. GATS Secretariat, The United States of America, Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 210, at 45.
219. GATS Secretariat, Hong Kong, Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 211,

at 11.
220. GATS Secretariat, The United States of America, Schedule of Specific Commit-

ments, supra note 210, at 17-36 (outlining the state-specific requirements for the supply of
legal services regarding competency, licensing, association with U.S. lawyers, etc.).
221. GATS, supra note 9, art. XXI, para. 2(a).
222. Id. art. XXII (concerning consultation), art. XXIII (concerning dispute settlement).
223. See supra Part IV.A-B.
224. See supra Part IV.G.
225. See infra Part V.A.
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telecommunications that it annexed to its 1994 Schedule of Specific
Commitments, 26 and any additional commitments made in its 1997
Schedule.22 7
First, the Parties generally agreed that the scope of the continued negotiations would be basic services provided through the four modes of
supply. = Next, they added in their individual Schedules, their reservations
and clarifications to how MFN, national treatment, and market access
would apply to the various types of basic telecommunications services as
supplied through the four modes. Additionally, most of the exceptions
were taken with regard to commitments on market access. Most Members
also undertook the commitments in the Reference Paper on regulatory
principles by incorporating the Paper into their Schedules under the
"additional commitments" column.

A.

List ofArticle II (MFN) Exemptionsfor Basic
Telecommunications

The Annex on Basic Telecommunications allowed the Parties to delay taking their Article II exemptions on basic telecommunications until
the conclusion of the negotiations; however, the exemptions followed the
same format as the
1994 exemptions and were attached to the 1994 Sched• 229
ule of Exemptions. Most of the developed countries did not take broad
MFN exemptions. The United States did take an MFN exemption on digital audio services and one-way satellite transmission of direct broadcast
satellite (DBS) television services. 0 Although the U.S. Article TI exemption applies to "all" countries, it was based on the "[n]eed to ensure sub-

226. See infra Part V.B.
227. See infraPart V.C.
228. See supra Part 11C (discussing what constitutes basic telecommunications services), notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing the four modes of supply).
229. See supra notes 106-09 (outlining the required elements of the exemptions).
230. DBS is a ku-band frequency that can accommodate a broad range of basic and enhanced services. The United States argued that direct broadcasting services are basic services and fell under the negotiations on basic telecommunications that concluded in 1997.
The United States believed that satellite services were not contemplated at the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round, as much of the DBS technology has been developed since 1994, and
that even if they were contemplated, they are basic services, the subject of the 1997 agreement, not enhanced services, which fell under the 1994 GATS. Canada and the European
Union argued that they are enhanced services and fell under the Uruguay Round of GATS
negotiations that concluded in 1994. Specifically, Canada and the European Union argued
that these services came under the United States' Uruguay commitments on television and
radio services. WTO Deal, supra note 205. Canada and the European Union at one point
threatened to take the matter before the WTO dispute settlement body. See generally supra
Part IV.F (discussing dispute settlement for services).
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stantially full market access and national treatment in certain markets. ' 1
Such a need was seen with regard to Canada, which has various measures
that limit U.S. service providers. 232
Some developing countries took exemptions, stating as a basis their
need to develop their domestic sectors. Brazil took an exemption for DBS,
while Argentina, at the last minute, took a broad MFN exemption on all
satellite services. 3 3

B.

Schedule of Specific Commitments for Basic
Telecommunications

The 1997 Schedules of Commitments on basic services structurally
resemble the 1994 Schedules of Commitments on services because, when
finalized, they are incorporated into the 1994 charts. Therefore, the 1997
231. WTO Secretariat, The United States of America, List of Article 1I (MFN)Exemptions, Supp. 2, GATS/EL90/Suppl.2 (Apr. 11, 1997) (visited Nov. 1, 1998)
<http:llwww.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html>.
232. The United States will keep its limits for Canada on foreign investment and services in satellite as long as Canada maintains its restrictions, which it claims are contentbased to preserve its public order and culture. WTO Deal, supra note 205. Canada's use of
this argument as a basis to deny U.S. companies necessary licenses to provide satellite
services shows the potential reach and economic impact. Taking the MFN exception allows
the United States to provide market access on a reciprocal basis, and in essence, reflects the
other reservations of the parties in their satellite offers. The U.S. Federal Communications
Commission has already taken steps to open U.S. satellite services to foreign participation.
See John R. Schmertz, Jr., & Mike Meier, U.S. Implements Market-Opening Commitment of
WTO Basic Telecom Agreement by Adopting New Standardfor Foreign Participationin
U.S. Satellite Services Market, 4 INT'L L. UPDATE 10 (1998).
233. WTO Secretariat Communicationfrom Argentina, List of Article H (MFN) Exemptions, GATS/EL4 (Apr. 11, 1997) (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep
public.html>. This exemption was particularly egregious to many of the negotiating Parties.
By the deadline, February 15, 1997, most of the Parties had finished their negotiations and
signed the agreement. However, Argentina, that day, pulled its entire offer, then put it back
on the table. But at 9:45 that night, Argentina announced it would keep a tight grip on all
satellite services. Argentina had launched its first satellite system, Nahuelsat, at the beginning of the month, to offer ku-band (used for DBS) and V-sat (used mostly to network
multinational corporations' internal communication). PanAm Sat had an offer being considered by the government to offer ku-band services to Argentina, and Hughes had just applied
for a license to begin offering services in 1998; in other countries, Hughes is offering kuband, which has the capacity to handle one of the largest and most popular packages of
services, including voice telephony, data transmission, cable television, and Internet access.
Argentina negotiators, when pressured by the United States, said that they would consider a
bilateral reciprocity agreement. However, as those in the industry have pointed out, most of
the U.S. satellite market is already open. Interview with Loretta L. Dunn, Vice President of
Trade & Commercial Policy, Hughes Electronics (Mar. 3, 1997) (having participated in the
Geneva negotiations on telecommunications, 1995-97). In Argentina's proposed reciprocity
agreement to be negotiated, it is believed that it will use the satellite market as leverage in
two other unrelated disputes (intellectual property, and textiles and footwear) it is currently
engaged in with the United States. WTO Deal, supra note 205.
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Schedules contain four columns: sectors covered, limitations on market
access, limitations on national treatment, and additional commitments.
Although most Members listed the same types of basic services as
being covered by their Schedule of Commitments, some Members broke
down the basic service subsectors based on where the services are provided,23 ' and some further based them on who is providing them.2 6 The
limitations for both market access and national treatment are made according to the four modes of supply, often with reference to horizontal
commitments made in the 1994 Schedule.
For market access, many of the Members did not list limitations for
cross-border supply and consumption abroad. However, some Members,
especially developing countries, did include phase-in periods for their
commitments.2 3 ' Most of the Members included limitations on commercial
presence by limiting foreign investment levels. By the conclusion of the
negotiations, forty-seven countries had committed to at least phase-in

authorization for 100 percent foreign ownership or control of most telecommunications services and facilities;2 38 ten countries opened up to foreign investment in certain sectors;239 and ten countries would not permit
234. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
235. For instance, they can be provided in the domestic market and in the international
market. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, Argentina, Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supp. I,
GATS/SC/4/SuppL1 (Apr. 11, 1997) (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wtolddf/
ep/public.html>.
236. For instance, Japan has different commitments based on whether the service provider has itself established telecommunications circuit facilities. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat,
Japan, Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supp. 2, GATS/SC/46/SuppL2 (Apr. 11, 1997)
(visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/ddf/ep/public.html>.
237. For example, Argentina listed November 8, 2000, as the implementation date for
some of its commitments on cross-border supply, consumption abroad, and commercial
presence. See WTO Secretariat, Argentina, Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supp. 1.
238. Twenty-four of those offers were made after the April 1996 deadline, which no
doubt, would not all have been achieved if the talks had concluded at that time. This category of countries made the commitment-the market (all sectors, private and public, local
and long-distance, and at 100%) is open, unless otherwise reserved. Most of the 47 countries have committed to open their markets beginning Jan. 1, 1998; although, some made
commitments that the markets will be opened on other dates in the future, from 1999 to
2004. A few exceptions to this liberalization were taken, e.g., excluding PTTs, local services, and 49% limits to any one foreign entity. The United States took an exception for
common carrier radio licenses, apparently to comply with section 310(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. WTO Secretariat, The United States, Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supp. 2, at 2-3.
239. Of note, were limited offers from: Hong Kong, which will only liberalize in resale,
call-back, and closed user groups; Brazil, which only liberalized on nonpublic services; and
Pakistan, which liberalized only in telex and fax, but no voice. Several countries allowed
100% in nonpublic or closed user group services; these have been referred to as intra-nets.
Also, many countries opened up satellite and cellular services, and some will allow competition for resellers. International and long-distance services ended up being more open than
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foreign control.240 As in the 1994 Schedule of Commitments on enhanced
services, the basic services commitments on market access for presence of
natural persons are generally unbound except as stated in the horizontal
section.
There are very few limitations on national treatment for the four
modes of supply. A few countries, however, require board members of
public telecommunications operators (PTOs) to have a domestic nationality for commercial presence and reference the horizontal commitments for
presence of natural persons. 242
The additional commitments for basic telecommunications are substantial. Most countries made a commitment to undertake the obligations
contained in a "Reference Paper," which they attached to their Schedules
without reservation.
C.

Reference Paper

Many commitments on the regulation of the basic telecommunications services industry were agreed upon multilaterally and were set out in
a Reference Paper, which was adopted by the negotiating group in April
1996. Adopting the Reference Paper was an attempt by the Members to
address some of the specific domestic barriers that service providers are
most frequently faced with when they attempt to access the network of
domestic PTOs.
In the telecommunications industry, often it is not feasible for new
entrants to build their own networks because even though the variable
costs are generally low, the fixed costs are extremely high. 24' Thus, new
entrants must be allowed to interconnect to the existing network of the
dominant provider. There must be competitive-based principles in place

local, as well.
240. Nevertheless, they did set percentages, ranging from 25 to 40, that foreign entities
could invest; they just cannot obtain a controlling share. Some of the notably poor offers
came from Brazil and Pakistan. Some countries did not make market access commitments at
all, including India and Indonesia.
241. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, Japan,Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supp. 2, at 2
(requiring board members and auditors of the domestic and international supplier to have
Japanese nationality and binding presence of natural persons to horizontal commitments).
243. Fixed costs would include construction of the base facilities and the international
networks that have the ability to serve private consumers and businesses; additionally, the
network may interconnect with other networks so interface technology would be needed.
Fixed costs would include development of the software to use the systems. Therefore, the
variable costs are only the hook-up expense of adding an additional user and the cost of the
disks that hold the operating software.
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that regulate the relationship between these new entrants and the dominant
,provider.
Another requirement for robust competition is regulatory reform.
While deregulation and competition are partners in market-oriented
economies for most sectors, an adequate regulatory framework is needed
for basic telecommunications to break up monopolistic powers, decrease
burdens on entering competitors, and prevent anticompetitive activity. Additional elements of liberalization are transparency of the rulemaking and
complaint processes and independence of government regulators. Coexistence of transparency and independence in the regulatory regime promotes
public trust and effective competition. Regulatory reform should also include the development of a fair appeal process for agency determinations
regarding licenses and access charges.
It appears that many of the commitments of the Reference Paper are
modeled after U.S. telecommunications and antitrust laws and practices. A
comprehensive approach to regulatory reform was needed, in part, because
the laws and regulations covering telecommunications in most countries
are anticompetitive in nature as the telecommunications market has historically been monopolized by the state. Additionally, unlike goods where
the provider does not have much interaction with regulators beyond the
country's borders, the service provider has significant interaction with
regulators once inside the borders of a country.
1.

Commitments

The Reference Paper sets the framework for licensing procedures,
interconnection to the public network, competition policy, transparency,
and independence of regulators. Some of the Parties adopted the Reference
Paper in whole, and others took some exceptions to elements of the Reference Paper, which were also attached in their Schedules.
a.

Licensing

In the licensing process, new entrants often face both technical and
procedural barriers. The technical barriers are loosely addressed in GATS.
The Recognition provision of GATS, Article VII, says that the domestic
body with the authority to review a license application should not use
technical or nontechnical criteria as a "disguised restriction" on trade in

services.

244

The Reference Paper further requires the domestic regulatory

244. GATS, supra note 9, art. VII, paras. 1, 3.
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body to provide the criteria, terms and conditions, and reasons for the denial of a license application.
b.

Interconnection

Facilities competition exists when new entrants, which can meet a
reasonable and objective set of standards, are allowed to interconnect to
the public network and provide services to end users in competition with
the PTOs. To have full facilities competition, however, new entrants must
be given interconnection rights broader in scope than simply interconnection to the public networks. Optimal market access depends on multiple
options: interconnecting to private and public networks, leasing available
circuits, sharing leased circuits, interconnecting between leased and
switched networks, and reselling transmission capacity.2 4 Additionally, the
terms of interconnection must provide adequate technical interface, provide adequate usage and supply conditions, and be based on competitive
tariffs.'
The Reference Paper sets the interconnection framework. Interconnection must be done on nationally based MFN principles. 241 The technical
standards and specifications, and other conditions must be transparent and
reasonable, and they must regard economic feasibility. 249 Rates should be
cost-oriented, transparent, and reasonable,250 and they should regard economic feasibility and be unbundled.25' Transparency is a requirement for
the terms of interconnection as well as for the concluded interconnection
contracts. 252 An independent domestic body should be made available for
commercial dispute settlement. Benefits of full facilities competition include lower prices and increased service quality. 253
245. WTO, Agreement on Telecommunications Services, Reference Paper, para. 4, 36
I.L.M. 354, 367 (Apr. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Reference Paper]. See The United States
Schedule of Specific Commitments, containing the Reference Paper.
246. OECD, TRADE IN INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 22.
247. Id.
248. Reference Paper, supra note 245, para. 2. However, there is an automatic exemption for a limited time, for LECs to other LECs, and there is an automatic exemption until
ordered otherwise by state regulators, for rural carriers to LECs. Id. n. 1
249. Id. para. 2.
250. Id.
251. Id. Unbundling of services is when the PTO allows the applicant, for a right of interconnection, to acquire only those services that it needs to service its potential customers.
252. Id. Historically, these agreements were viewed as private contracts and were never
transparent. However, without transparency, there is no way to know if new entrants or foreign entrants are being discriminated against.
253. Countries with the longest history of liberalized interconnection rules have the low-

est prices and correspondingly high quality of service. OECD,

TELECOMMUNICATION

INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 2, at 32-36 (listing the United States, the United Kingdom,
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By way of example, these liberalized interconnection rules are especially important to the international cellular market, which has had an appreciable impact on communications technology. Cellular service providers, which provide radio-based services, "depend heavily on local
exchange carriers and interexchange carriers to connect the land line system with the cellular system." 4
c.

Anticompetitive Practices

Rules on licensing and interconnection fit hand-in-hand with antitrust
laws that prohibit market participants from limiting access to an essential
facility and thus keeping out competition.
The essential facilities doctrine has impacted the use of telecommunications infrastructure in the United States. The essential facilities doctrine prevents a business from extending its "monopoly power from one
stage of production to another, and from one market into another."25 5 This
doctrine may arise in the context of the telecommunications industry because the start-up businesses that put the infrastructure in place may exclude competitors from offering their services over the infrastructure.
In a suit between MCI and AT&T, MCI prevailed on its claim that
AT&T, by denying it access to the telephone network, was monopolizing
an essential facility. To prevail, MCI showed: "(1) control of the essential
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
25 6
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility."
This U.S. test was adopted almost verbatim in the Reference Paper.257 Additionally, the Reference Paper incorporates the U.S. antitrust concept of
market power.25'
To avoid anticompetitive effects, the Members are to ensure competitive safeguards, by preventing the dominant supplier from (1) engaging
in anticompetitive cross-subsidization; (2) using information with antiand Japan).
254. ABA SECTION OF ANTrRUST LAW, ANTT RUST LAW DEVELOPMENTs 1159 (4th ed.
1997).
255. MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 891 (1983). The doctrine originated in the Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
256. MCI Comm. Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132-33.
257. The network is "exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers, and cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to
provide a service." Reference Paper, Definitions, supra note 245.
258. "A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms
of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic telecommunications services as a result of: (a) control over essential facilities; or (b) use of its
position in the market." Id.
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competitive results; and (3) withholding technical information that is necessary for an entrant to compete. Z 9
Finally, nondiscrimination safeguards are supposed to be implemented by Members. Safeguards are rules that prevent the dominant carrier from abusing its market power against potential entrants. Abusive actions would include: the cross-subsidization of competitive service with
revenues from noncompetitive public network services; the overcharging
of competitors for access to the Public Telecommunications Network
(PTN); and discrimination in giving access to or information about the
PTN. Additionally, interconnection regulations control the access to the
network for the origination or termination of telecommunications services.
Interconnection may be network-to-network or network-to-service provider. If the terms of interconnection are subject to private party negotiations, the interconnection policies must force the dominant carrier to negotiate in an open, economical, and cost-based manner.W Some countries
are taking a sector-by-sector approach for these commitments. 261
Cross-sector subsidization is a significant barrier to full and fair
competition. In many countries, service providers use a certain clientele to
subsidize another-long-distance and international services to subsidize
local services, urban customers to subsidize rural customers, and businesses to subsidize residential consumers. Usage revenue can also be used
to subsidize network upgrades, and revenue from one sector, such as cellular, can be used to subsidize another, like wire-line. Finally, telecommunications service fees can be used by a PTT to subsidize unrelated telecommunications infrastructure costs, or even nontelecommunications
obligations of the government.
The Reference Paper sets out the general prohibition on cross-sector
subsidization, but it does not set the specific initiatives that have to be
taken in order to ensure competition. However, a fully competitive policy
would require service providers to keep separate accounts262 and would al263
low tariff rebalancing.
259. Id. at para. 1.2.
260. The FCC can mandate that a common carrier provide interconnection if it deems
access to be in "the public interest."
261. For instance, cellular telephony is being liberalized quickly, while voice services
are often either state-controlled or monopolized.
262. Where the need to keep markets competitive exists, companies must keep separate
accounts for their operations in different telecommunications segments. Otherwise, the consumers' demands of a company in one account, that may be rather inelastic, may be forced
to cross-subsidize the consumers of a sector where their demand is relatively elastic or
where the competition is relatively high.
263. Tariff rebalancing is when: (1) fixed charges are raised relative to usage charges,
particularly in the case of line rentals; (2) local charges are raised, for example, by decreas-
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,1
Transparency
Never before have the Parties to the WTO negotiated successful
transparency for a market that is as pervaded by government participation
and regulation as the telecommunications equipment and service market.
The regulation-related obligations are much more specific under the concluded Agreement on Basic Telecommunications than iinder GATT and
GATS. 264 Often, the transparency required for trade in goods is only that a
country publish its import tariff schedule and those other potential nontariff barriers (NTBs) at the border. Transparency for telecommunications
includes making available regulations and tariff schedules that govern the
provision
utilization of services, 26s an activity inherently within the
borders of and
a country.
d.

e.

Independence of Regulators and Review of Decisions
There needs to be independence between the telecommunications
regulators and the telecommunications service providers. While the rules
must be accessible to the private sector, the regulators must be detached,
that is, have no economic or political interest in the outcome of making
rules, granting and renewing licenses, reviewing supplier agreements, resolving disputes, and applying sanctions.266 The Reference Paper further
requires "the regulatory body [to be] separate from,
and not accountable to,
• ,,267
any supplier of basic telecommunications services.
GATS requires the Members to "maintain or institute as soon as
practicable judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures
which provide, at the request of an affected service supplier, for the
prompt review of, and where justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade in services. 26 1 The Reference Paper requires that an effective appeal procedure be in place and that the decisions
be "impartial with respect to all market participants.2 6 9

ing the size of the local call zone; (3) long-distance and international calls are reduced with

a greater use of off-peak tariffs; and (4) service providers are allowed to reduce rates for
high-volume users. ITU,WORLD REPORT, supra note 30, at 68.

264. See infra Part V.C (discussing the negotiating objective of comprehensive regulatory reform).
265. Reference Paper, supra note 245, para. 2.
266. In many countries, the regulator and the provider of services have both been the

same state-operated entity.
267. Reference Paper, supra note 245, para.5.
268. GATS, supra note 9, art. VI, para. 2.
269. Reference Paper, supra note 245, para. 5.
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2.

Exceptions
In addition to the exceptions in GATS, 270 there are two telecommunications-specific exceptions to the commitments
in the Reference PaperS 271
scarce resources and universal service. The inclusion of the exceptions in
the Reference Paper does not, however, encourage use of the exceptions by
the Parties. In fact, their inclusion was probably more out of an anticipation by the Members that countries, wishing to minimize competition in
their domestic market, would use either of these rationales to retract their
liberalization offers. Using either rationale for restrictive trade measures
would cover many more policies than would an exception such as the national security exception; therefore, the Members sought to outline their
limited use.
a.

Scarce Resources
This provision is intended for allocations of resources such as radio
spectrum. The commitments of the Reference Paper, including licensing
and interconnection, apply to all sectors, including spectrum management,
but this paragraph will allow Parties to make their initial decisions about
spectrum allocation apart from the underlying principles of GATS, that is,
they can be discriminatory. Those decisions, though, must be carriedout
in a nondiscriminatory manner. Thus, the scarce resources exception ensures only that procedures for allocation are carried out in an objective,
timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner.272
In effect, the provision may allow a country effectively to cut out
new entrants for certain telecommunications sectors. For instance, a country may have a spectrum width of thirty-five for a particular service. It
could reserve twenty for its PTT, keep five for noninterference, and auction off ten, which would have to be divided nondiscriminatorily among all
new entrants. This creates a technical problem for the new entrants that can
affect both their ability to provide services and the quality of those services.

270. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the five general exceptions: public morals; public
health; GATS consistent domestic laws; national security; and balance of payments).
271. Reference Paper, supra note 245, paras. 6 & 3, respectively.
272. The complete provision reads:
Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including frequencies, numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in an objective, timely, transparent, and non-discriminatory manner. The current state of allocated frequency
bands will be made publicly available, but detailed identification of frequencies
allocated for specific government uses is not required.
Id. para. 6.
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Universal Service

A common reason cited for failure to liberalize the telecommunications sector is that some goals of universal service, such as providing basic
telephone services• to• •273
rural or low-income areas, would not be met in a
fully-competitive environment. Under the Reference
Paper, each country
• 274
can define its own objectives for universal service.
Conceivably, steps taken to implement an aggressive universal service program that has the government taking the lead role could run contrary to most of the commitments in the Reference Paper, including licensing, interconnection, allocation of spectrum, and independence of the
regulatory body. The Member can take action, however, to implement such
a program, and the action will not be considered anticompetitive per se, as
long as it is administered in a neutral manner and is "not more burdensome
275 If necessary is interpreted in the same way it has been
than necessary."
•• 276
interpreted for the GAIT, Article XX exceptions, then the universal
service exception will rarely be used successfully. Under GATT's Article
XX test of necessary, the means of implementing a domestic universal
service policy could not be inconsistent with the underlying GATS principles of MFN treatment, transparency, national treatment, and market access. Presumably, though, the strict GATT test would apply only to the restrictive trade measures inconsistent with a general obligation of GATS
that has not been excepted in a Schedule or with a specific commitment
that has been included in a Schedule.
Universal service is one of the most significant issues driving domestic basic telecommunications policy. It is an especially pressing goal
for developing countries. 277 One of the most significant challenges faced by
developing and emerging countries is their lack of comprehensive infrastructure that will provide, at a minimum, basic services.278 There are traditional ways of addressing this hurdle, namely, maintaining government
273. The OECD asked countries what justified maintaining monopoly telecommunications facilities and services, and the most common response was that liberalization would
not meet the goals of universal service. OECD, COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK 1993, at 12123 (1993).
274. Reference Paper, supra note 245, para. 3.
275. Id. (emphasis added).
276. See supra Part IV.D.1 (discussing GATS' general exceptions in the context of
GATT's general exceptions).
277. Fifty percent of the world's population has never used a telephone, and 50% of the
people worldwide live two hours from the nearest telephone. Larry Irving, Telecommunications Policy Reform: Competitionand ConsumerProtection,29 TELECOMM. 26 (1995).
278. Another significant change is the absence of a well-developed regulatory framework; although, it is less significant since there are many and varying models for developing countries to consider.
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operation of the infrastructure or subsidization of the services. Alternatively, there are some newly emerging ways to address the need for basic
services, such as encouraging multinational conglomerates to finance telecommunications projects in developing countries or allowing revenue from
liberalized international trade in services to finance the developing country's domestic market need for telecommunications infrastructure.
Countries are essentially on their own when they keep policies in
place that make the government the sole provider of basic telecommunications services. In order to implement a universal service program domestically, a government could take a variety of approaches, but most of these
will not be consistent with the spirit of GATS or the 1997 Telecommunications Commitments. For instance, owning the telecommunications infrastructure and cross-subsidizing the economically disadvantaged classes in
society is not consistent with the Reference Paper, and socializing a private
market through tax-funded subsidies may not be consistent with future negotiations on subsidies under GATS.
Another option is for foreign conglomerates to finance the infrastructure costs. To address the financial hurdle faced by such projects, the
ITU, in partnership with the private sector, established WorldTel. 279
WorldTel functions much like an international development bank that finances telecommunications and information technology projects. Equity
partners of the bank are other financial organizations, the private sector,
and institutional investors.2 0 However, these resources are not widely
available to the majority of countries, and WorldTel projects will not set
the stage for a comprehensive telecommunications policy to meet consumer demands for basic and enhanced services.
A third option is to deregulate the market domestically, while negotiating market access and nondiscrimination internationally. Essentially,
counting on market supply to meet the broad spectrum of technical and social demands will result in more universal service of basic telecommunications by promoting economic efficiency and technological advancement.
VI. BENEFITS OF LIBERALIZED TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE
TO DOMESTIC INTERESTS
The liberalization and regulatory reform of the GATS framework and
the subsequent 1997 commitments in basic telecommunications will in279. The ITU is a 184-country organization essentially responsible for global standardization, regulation, planning, and coordination of telecommunications policies.
280. AT&T and Ameritech, both U.S. companies, were among the 30 initial investors
that financed a feasibility study on the commercial viability of the WorldTel concept. As a
result, seed capital is being sought to begin some pilot projects through WorldTel.
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crease benefits to domestic consumers by allowing more cooperation and
opening up competition between the cross-sectors of the telecommunications industry. As long as the antitrust laws are enforced in line with preventing anticompetitive behavior and supporting new entrants, then technology innovation and development should surge. However, the universal
service goal is to ensure that basic services are provided to those without
them, not to ensure that the most advanced services are provided to those
that already have the basic services.
There is possibly a Pareto improvement to be made between domestic universal service policy and liberalized trade policy.281 Technology innovation and free trade can ultimately stand in good company with social
benefits and diversity of services, if free trade, for example, trading on the
basis of comparative advantage through lower tariffs, fewer non-tariff barriers, and fewer restrictions on foreign ownership, allows technology to
surge ahead of social demand. That is, trade liberalization allows market
forces to induce prosperity. Prosperity, in turn, increases the capital base
for social benefits and diversity through technological innovation and
212
more efficient resource use. However, this argument is based on the assumption that a long-run equilibrium between technological growth and
283
socially diverse innovation is acceptable.

281. A Pareto improvement in economics is a net increase in benefit without the offsetting decrease. Ultimately, these Pareto improvements can reach the Pareto optimum. In a
fully competitive domestic market, for example, one in which the limited resources are being fully employed and there is no international trade, then this is not possible. See PAUL A.
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, EcoNoMics 136 n.1 (15th ed. 1995) (noting that the
concept of a Pareto improvement was first proposed by and was named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), an Italian economist). However, when markets begin to specialize based
on what they produce most efficiently, and they trade with other markets, it becomes possible. This is because of the concept of comparative advantage. Id. at 678-86. When trade
opens and each country concentrates on its area of comparative advantage, everyone is better off. Workers in each region can obtain a larger quantity of consumer goods for the same
amount of work when people specialize in the areas of comparative advantage and trade
their own production for goods in which they have a relative disadvantage. When borders
are opened to international trade, the national income of each and every trading country
rises. Id. at 681. See also PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 11-63 (4th ed. 1997).
282. DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE

GATT: TRADE, ENvIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE
64, 66 (1994) (citing the Brundtiand Report).
283. Contrast this equilibrium with another: the often-touted conflict between economic
growth and environmental benefits. "IT]he time lags between economic growth and increases in environmental spending may be substantial." Id. at 64 (quoting the position of
environmentalists). Consider, for example, the amount of time between the "industrial
revolutions" and the "environmental revolutions" in the United States and Europe. However, the industrial revolutions began when society was generally unconcerned with the environment. The telecommunications revolution is occurring in the 1990s when society generally is concerned about social diversity and access.
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This assumption is true in economic terms, but may not be true in
political or social terms. Some argue that the invisible hand of market
forces is attached to an insufficiently socially conscious body.2 4 This body
is the democratic political system that often adheres to the most organized
public interest. However, this long-run versus short-run argument becomes
unpersuasive if, during economic expansion, firms comply with the socially beneficial provisions in telecommunications regulations by internalizing the costs, and in turn, the expense of internalization is ameliorated
by trade incentives through fewer non-tariff barriers and more cost-based
tariffs. Thus, a more open international market absorbs the costs of the social benefits because of its high potential for expansion rather than that internalized cost being passed on to domestic consumers. The implementation of these trade benefits can be incorporated into the tariff schedules
and, in a sense, "institutionalized."' ' Thus, in the short run, firms can
comply with social policies because of the offsetting benefits from trade
liberalization. 286 To ensure fairness, the Members' Schedules must reflect
287
reciprocal market access.
The domestic legal framework that incorporates, as a part, some cost
sharing for the furtherance of socially beneficial domestic policy would
increase universal access benefits for some. Any detriment to those who

284. This is what environmentalists have argued in the trade and environmental conflicts. They say that in the short run, "the invisible hand of market forces is attached to an
insufficiently environmentally conscious body." Id.
285. Many pro-trade commentators have argued that setting stringent trade policy up
front in an institutionalized context, instead of allowing countries to react to market changes
with protectionist policies, actually strengthens trading markets and national sovereignty.
"'The World Trade Organization will expand the sovereignty of American citizens by reducing the power of interest groups to manipulate trade policy."' Id. at 93 (quoting Joe
Cobb of the Heritage Foundation (1994)).
286. "By enshrining the principles of liberal trade in an international regime, the creators
of the GAT... elevated the commitment to freer trade to a nearly 'constitutional' level...
.[This] provides a mechanism for addressing the collective-action problem that plagues
domestic trade policymaking and thereby enhances society's overall economic well-being,
promotes international stability, and serves the long-term public interest." Id. at 76.
287. One of the complaints of the generalized system of preferences (GSP), which is a
system whereby developed countries formulate tariff schedules for developing countries
that are more favorable than the MFN schedules, is that the developing countries fail to give

reciprocal market access. See

HON. ROBERT W. NEY, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFER-

H.R. Doc. No. 104-167 (1995) (arguing to renew the GSP program, but pointing out
that U.S. ceramic tile manufacturers are still denied reciprocal market access to foreign
markets). Ney suggests that nonreciprocal access always has adverse effects. It harms the
exporters in developed countries when they are denied access to the developing country's
markets, for example, the U.S. GSP position. Id. Nonreciprocal access harms the exporters
in developing countries when the developed country responds with other trade measures to
control imports such as discriminatory product standards, packaging, or testing, for example, the EU GSP position. Id.
ENCES,
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are bearing the costs of it would be offset by the benefits that are obtained
from GATS commitments on telecommunications that reduced trade barriers on services. Thus, this domestic/international arrangement could increase access to basic and enhanced services for some without decreasing
universal service to any. Ultimately, it will increase both enhanced and basic telecommunications services for all-the Pareto improvement of domestic social goals and international free trade.

